
This is a preliminary version of the chapter, which has been finally published in Niemann, A., Garcia, B. and Grant, W. (eds) (2011), The Transformation of European Football: Towards the Europeanisation of the national game, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Chapter 10  The Europeanisation of Austrian Football: historically-determined and modern processes of Europeanisation

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This chapter seeks to analyse the Europeanisation of Austrian football both as a consequence of pressures stemming from the European integration process and changes in domestic football involving other transnational (non-EU) European bodies and phenomena. As for the former, we will look at the impact of the 1995 Bosman ruling of the European Court of Justice (both in terms of the nationality regime and the transfer regime) and the European Commission’s activities to induce decentralised marketing of broadcasting rights in the EU. In terms of the second dimension we will investigate the impact of the UEFA Champions League and UEFA Cup (now Europa League) on Austrian football and look for Europeanising mechanisms that eventually emanate from transnational groupings/club fora. In addition, we will analyse the relevance of a ‘historically-determined’ Europeanisation process in Austrian football. Our hypothesis in this regard is that Austria – due to its heritage as a fairly multinational state (Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy) – has been more internationally-oriented right from the beginnings of the game. Thus, it had been Europeanised to some degree (as regards the multiethnic make-up of the teams and the almost natural Central European frame of reference for team competition etc.) long before European integration kicked in. On the other hand, some of the more recent Europeanising dynamics that can be observed in other European leagues, not least its biggest neighbour Germany, are substantially weaker in Austrian football.
Germany will serve as a case of comparison throughout the text, not least because of the special and precarious German-Austrian football relationship as neighbours sharing a language and to some degree historical-cultural heritage, the big vs. small country-difference, as well as the allegedly different styles of play frequently invoked especially by Austrian commentators. Having said that, in some instances Austrian football has, despite all gestures of dissociation, engaged in what could be dubbed ‘transnational benchmarking’ as regards German football (Adrian and Schächtele 2008: 81-98). An analytic argument for using Germany as a comparison foil would be that in the German case, several and distinct dimensions of Europeanisation can be made visible all at once (see chapter on Germany in this volume).

The chapter is structured as follows: the first section will discuss Europeanisation/internationalisation processes long before the Bosman era, dating back to the beginning and the middle of the 20th century. Section two looks at the nationality issue of the Bosman ruling. The third part of the chapter deals with the transfer regime aspect of the Bosman ruling and the issue of broadcasting rights. Thereafter we consider more transnational Europeanisation processes by discussing the influence of the Champions League and UEFA-Cup, and take up the issue of transnational club fora, before drawing some conclusions from our analysis.

**Austrian Football before Bosman**

There is a quite well-researched cultural studies-oriented account of the historical trajectories of this sport in Austria (Horak 1992, 2002; Marschik 1998, 2001; Marschik and Sottopietra 2000). Two interesting strands of arguments with regard to
our concerns here are to be found: first, the ‘Austrification’ thesis (Horak), which basically highlights that Austrian football from its beginnings up until the second half of the 20th century for the most part meant football in its capital Vienna; second, the pivotal role of Austrian/Viennese clubs and figures in the creation of a distinctive Central European format and space of the game (Marschik’s treatment of Central European football).

First, Austrification – the idea that a real Austrian football has only come into play in the latter half of the 20th century through a combination of modern economic strategies of management, i.e. professionalisation and commercialisation, with an explicit anti-metropolitan attitude (Horak 1992: 65) – at first glance seems to contradict the hypothesis of an internationally-oriented football. However, a closer look at the contours of Viennese football reveals our idea. Although the equation Austria = Vienna (expressed in the fact that up until the late 1940s the Viennese champion was considered to be the Austrian one) seems to indicate that the most dynamic development of Austrian football was restricted to a specific space, this very space – Vienna not only as capital3, but as the central city of the ancient multinational dual monarchy – and its characteristics as a melting pot of cultures, ethnics, refugees, migrants and inhabitants come into play. The case of one of Austria’s/Vienna’s most prominent players is instructive in this regard: Matthias Sindelar, a mythical figure of Austria’s football in those times, had been the descendant of Moravians who migrated to the poor suburb of Vienna-Favoriten (Horak and Maderthaner 1996: 141-151). As John points out, many players in the so-called interwar period came as refugees or migrants from Bohemian, Moravian and Hungarian regions, thus making the Viennese teams relatively international squads (John 2008: 16) by today’s standards. Although there is no systematic study to the composition of the crowd, one can safely
assume that the masses that flocked to the games were in sum similarly heterogeneous in terms of their ethnic background. This fact is only confirmed by the multiplicity of clubs in Vienna catering not only to different social milieus, but also ethnic/religious lines (the Czech Slovan or the Jewish Hakoah, for instance). Vienna as a central space for Austrian football to emerge and develop thus has been a fairly international place, not in the sense of necessarily mixing people from heterogeneous backgrounds, but of bringing players and spectators from various ethnic and Central European national backgrounds into contact under the rubric of Viennese (=Austrian) football.

The idea that Austrian/Viennese football was fairly internationalised, especially with regard to Europe, even before World War II is further confirmed by the fact that the most important frame of orientation for Viennese clubs has been the so-called Central European triangle, i.e. the tripartite competition between Vienna, Prague and Budapest. As Marschik and Sottopietra (2000) have elaborated in depth, the very idea of a Central European football space – as a transboundary space of action, one could say for our purposes – and a distinctive style of football that developed out of frequent contacts, matches and peer-group orientation can be attributed to large degrees to Viennese clubs and charismatic figures at the national level (most importantly, Hugo Meisl, the General Secretary of the Austrian Football Association, ÖFB, in the interwar period⁴). This dense network also led to the establishment of the so-called Mitropa⁵ Cup (a club competition in the triangle mentioned above, with Italy and Yugoslavia also incorporated) and the International Cup (national team competition).⁶ Both tournaments have obviously been forerunners of now well-established competitions at the European level (Mittag and Legrand 2009). It is in this regard important to bear in mind that the unofficial Central European Championships were initially only established on the basis of private
arrangements worked out between the participating associations, which underscores the density and depth of the cross-border network of interactions. The reasons for establishing these international (albeit regionally bounded) contacts on a regular basis seem to be manifold: sport may have served as a means of the respective young states that had belonged to the former empire to normalise their relations; this common heritage in turn may also explain that the contact among these very actors evolved in the first place. In any case, business interests and the will to generate extra revenue by establishing an attractive tournament for the masses have been a primary incentive (Marschik 2001: 10). With the occupation of Austria through Nazi Germany in 1938, the Central European dimension of its football for a large part ceased to exist and never recovered even after 1945, although there have been attempts at a revival in the years after World War II (Marschik and Sottopietra 2000: 297-371).

Thus, it is not too far-fetched to state that the Europeanisation of Austrian football has an important pre-Bosman dimension. While in other cases, such as the German, European impulses and orientations can be attributed in large parts to the workings of European institutions since the 1990s, Austrian football already brought an impressive historical-cultural record with a deep imprint of Central European orientation with it, when Austria became an EU member in 1995. From its beginnings, Austrian football has thus been more internationally oriented, albeit with a clear focus on Central Europe. Regarding the composition of the teams and transboundary contacts as well as alignments of clubs and football associations, it has been (Central) ‘Europeanised’ since the first half of the 20th century.

The Bosman Ruling I: The nationality issue
Prior to the Bosman ruling, the migration of (professional) football players towards Austrian clubs had been significantly influenced by rules enacted by the Austrian football association (ÖFB), the professional league (partly induced by Austrian politics) as well as by UEFA and FIFA. The few foreign players that came to play in Austria in the first years after World War II were mainly refugees. At the end of 1945 there were an estimated one million displaced persons in Austria: (former) forced laborers and prisoners of war, survivors of concentration camps and ethnic Germans fleeing from Eastern Europe. FIFA rules that were implemented in Austria hampered their participation in Austrian football: sportsmen who were members of foreign football associations required the clearance/approval of their home association. Foreign and stateless persons also required the permission of the ÖFB in order to participate in official games. At the same time foreign players were regarded with suspicion by some Austrian football officials and in 1949 the newly formed pan-Austrian Football League (Staatsliga) adopted a rule limiting the number of foreign players used in a match to three. This rule survived until the mid 1960s.

The league reform of 1964 led – after heated discussions in the media over ‘foreign legionaries’ in Austrian football – to a reduction of foreign players to two per team. This was changed back to three with the season 1970-71. While the proportion of foreign players decreased in the mid and late 1960s, it then rose to 15 per cent in 1973. The oil crisis of the same year and the subsequent recession led to a general halt in the recruitment of foreign workers (through the social partners) in Austria, a step that was paralleled by the ÖFB, which ruled that the clubs of the two professional leagues could not contract any additional foreign players. In 1977 the Austrian Football Association again liberalised the rules governing the use of foreign players to two. At the same time players that had already played for a respective club in the
1976-77 season were not counted towards the respective foreigner’s contingents. This was largely in line with the rule enacted by UEFA in 1978 – after negotiations with the European Commission – in which it recommended allowing at least two foreign players, while excluding assimilated players (that had been in residence for at least five years in the respective country) from this restriction. As result, the proportion of foreign players rose again, from 6.7 per cent in 1976-77 to 11.8 per cent in 1978-79 (Liegl and Spitaler 2009: 240).

The fall of the iron curtain in the late 1980s turned Austria increasingly into a country of transit and immigration. The political changes also affected the football migration regime, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. Transfer rule restrictions there were gradually abolished and players increasingly made use of their freedom of travel. This led to an increase especially of Hungarian and Czechoslovakian players in Austrian football (Duke 1994: 159), however, mostly with regard to the lower leagues, amateur teams and commuters (Pendler), who continued to live in their home countries, but played/worked for a certain time in Austria. Within professional football, this surge has not been felt that much, not least since Austria more and more lost its special appeal as a destination for Central and East European players. Before 1989, the geo-political position of Austria as a neutral state in Central Europe gave the Austrian clubs a privileged position in their negotiations with communist sport authorities in Eastern and Central Europe to receive approval for contracting players or managers from these countries (mostly from Czechoslovakia or Hungary; even the first Soviet player in the West signed a contract in Austria with Rapid Vienna). After 1989, it increasingly became a transit country in this regard.9

With the Austrian accession to the EU in 1995, the Bosman ruling of the same year also became effective in Austria. Hence, players with an EU/EEA nationality
were treated equally to Austrians from 1996-97, as a result of which any restrictions limiting their numbers were now illegal. But Austria went even further than that. The competent Federal Ministry ruled in 1996 that up to five third country-nationals were allowed per club.\textsuperscript{10} In 1998, the Ministry further liberalised by putting third country-nationals that had been in residence for a longer time (and those with a trainee player qualification) on par with Austrian players. In 2001, the Ministry extended the maximum number of third country-players to seven.

There seemed to be several explanations for this liberalisation beyond what was strictly required through the Bosman ruling. First, Austrian professional clubs obviously expected to gain a certain advantage through this extensive liberalisation. The two professional leagues attracted (and still attract), above all, players from Central and Eastern Europe, including former Yugoslavia. Clubs sought to continue to make use of these players, given that there were and still are relatively moderately-priced and thus affordable for the Austrian clubs. Second, it could be argued that the Europeanisation pressures were accompanied and paralleled by more general trends towards globalisation, liberalisation and deregulation (Giulianotti 1999; Giulianotti and Robertson 2007; Lanfranchi and Taylor 2001: 222). In this regard, professional football increasingly came to be seen as a distinct field of business, but nevertheless part of a neo-liberally restructured economic sphere.\textsuperscript{11}

As a result of such liberalisation the proportion of foreign players increased sharply in the post-Bosman era. While in 1995 19 per cent of top league football players in Austria were foreigners, this percentage had doubled by 2000. This rise constituted the biggest change in terms of the composition of club teams in the last 40 years. In terms of regional tendencies there has also been a certain shift since 1995 with the reduction of the proportion of players from Eastern Europe and all
neighbouring countries in general (Liegl and Spitaler 2009: 247), while the percentage of players from the EU temporarily rose from seven percent in 1994-95 to 31.5 percent in 1999-2000, now including players from countries such as Belgium, France or Greece.

After several years of liberalisation, further accelerated by a change of government to a center-right coalition that now included the right-wing-populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), voices were increasingly raised that advocated certain counter-measures to be taken against the continuous inflow of foreign-born players that had followed the Bosman ruling. In 2001, the sports minister Susanne Riess-Passer (FPÖ) only conditionally gave her consent to a further extension of third-country foreigners in Austrian professional football. The condition, around which the compromise was built, was the so-called 9+9-rule, agreed upon at a round table meeting comprising representatives of the League, the ÖFB, the players’ union, the Ministry of Economics, the leading FPÖ politicians Jörg Haider and Peter Westenthaler, as well as the sports minister. The clubs voluntarily committed themselves to a Gentlemen’s agreement – at least nine players had to be listed on the match sheet that could be selected for Austrian national teams (Reisinger 2003: 73). This agreement was justified with the need to advance young talented national players (in order to enhance the performance the national teams). As EU/EEA-foreigners were not treated equally to nationals in this rule, the non-conformity to EU standards of the 9+9 rule was obvious from the beginning.\textsuperscript{12} It was, however, never taken to the courts, not least since already after a few months, the Gentlemen’s agreement had
been undermined by Sturm Graz, a club that did not want to forgo certain foreign
players in a decisive league match.

The chiefs of the professional Football League (Bundesliga) clubs however agreed on another arrangement, which still holds today. While the number of seven third country-players remained constant until July 2003, a premium system (that was already part of the 9+9-rule) was extended, which rewards the use of Austrian players. With this compensatory measure, also referred to as the so-called Österreicher-Topf (the Austrians pot), money earned from broadcasting rights is paid to clubs according to the minutes that players who can be selected for Austrian national teams were fielded. Legally, this arrangement seems to be somewhat dubious since it introduces at least an incentive to discriminate between Austrians and EU-nationals (potentially to the latters’ disadvantage). With the exception of internationally oriented clubs such as Red Bull Salzburg, most Austrian clubs seek to receive the relatively modest sums and the overall percentage of non-Austrian players in the Austrian Bundesliga has indeed decreased from 41 per cent in 2003-4 to 37 in 2007-8 (Liegl and Spitaler 2009: 247).

A number of actors have advocated the enactment of compensatory measures for the consequences of the liberalisation since Bosman; at the forefront in this regard have certainly been prominent Austrian media outlets. They continuously deplored the disadvantages for Austrian football of bringing (as most Austrian media presume: often mediocre) foreign players into the Bundesliga, which was said to have increasingly prevented young national talents to play sufficiently in Austrian professional football, and to decrease the quality of the national team in the long run. The media discourse was flanked and in some cases also further fed by politicians; not
least because the restrictions demanded fitted into the world view of the right-wing populist FPÖ and their spin-off BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria).

Since 2004, the admission of third-country nationals to Bundesliga clubs is governed by the state’s legislation for key professionals in certain segments of the market (Schlüsselarbeitskräfte), for whom a minimal wage is foreseen. A numerical restriction per club is thus no longer verified. This basically amounted to an almost de facto full liberalisation, at least for the (truly) professional Premier League. In the first years after the introduction of this legislation the set quotas were not reached, while there were problems after 2006 as quotas were exhausted.

Overall, the nationality issue of the Bosman ruling set in motion, or at least substantially furthered, a very significant liberalisation of the nationality regime in Austrian football. As in the case of Germany, the measures accompanying the ruling were varied: mainly progressive aspects, such as the gradual opening up of the players’ market for third-country nationals (thus going beyond the legally demanded deregulation measures with regard to EU/EEA foreigners), were accompanied by more conservative steps and counter-tendencies, first through the more discussed than enacted 9+9 rule and then and nowadays through the Österreicher-Topf. However, all in all this led to enormous changes in the make-up of Austrian professional football, which seem to be aptly captured by the notion of ‘system transformation’.

The Bosman ruling II (transfer regime) and the issue of Broadcasting Rights

The second element of the Bosman ruling, which rendered FIFA’s international transfer regime illegal, and the marketing of broadcasting rights have in common that both initiated a complex and long policy process, in which several advocacy groups
tried to get their interests heard and be taken care of in the context of EU institutions (Parrish 2003). Austrian football had to adapt to both these changes, but the question then is: have Austrian clubs – as compared, for instance, to their most prominent German counterparts – or has the Austrian Football Association been involved in these struggles at the European level? As our research has not produced any substantial result, this would seem to suggest that there has not been much activism on the part of Austrian actors. But then, what accounts for this lack of activism?

Several arguments come to mind. First, Austria – as a relatively small member and a newcomer to the EU in the second half of the 1990s – has had other (more) important interests to pursue. Thus, sports policy was certainly not high on the agenda of Austrian politicians. It seems reasonable that a similar mechanism has prevented the ÖFB as the representative of Austrian football to act visibly on a European level beside the successful bid for the EURO 2008, together with Switzerland. The ÖFB is a relatively small association\textsuperscript{18}, whose expertise, resources and personal contacts on the European level, especially with regard to political institutions, seem to have been limited. Beyond that, its is safe to assume that the smaller national associations took part in the struggle for a new transfer regime or regarding the collective selling of broadcasting rights merely as interested spectators, monitoring (if at all) what the larger associations and the representatives of bigger clubs were trying to negotiate \textit{vis-à-vis} the European Commission.\textsuperscript{19}

Two further explanations for the lack of agency on behalf of Austrian club representatives as well as the ÖFB seem promising. On the one hand, the relationship between the (big) clubs in Austria and the national association is more harmonious\textsuperscript{20} and not so much marked by opposition/dualism as in other cases (think of Germany). Hence, the need to go to Brussles to engage EU institutions for specific interests (such
as decentralised marketing of TV rights) has arguably been lower. On the other hand, as will be shown below, the issue of broadcasting rights does not constitute such an enormous issue for the (major) Austrian clubs, not least since the rights are sold collectively by the League and at a relatively low rate (thus making the sum of money to be distributed relatively small). Currently (2007-10), the Football League receives a total of €14.33 million per year (paid by both public television ÖRF and Pay-TV to all clubs of the Bundesliga), a sum that is easily dwarfed by the approximately €1.4 billion in the English market or the €440 million in Germany at that time. It should be obvious from this account that broadcasting revenues make up a relatively small share of the average club’s total annual earnings, as the average Bundesliga team spends about €10 million per year. This does not mean that the general question of the legal permissibility of collective selling schemes is not applicable to Austria as well, it rather indicates that the (big) clubs – main drivers of Europeanisation in the German case, for instance – have shown little activism in pursuing any interest concerning (a decentralisation of) broadcasting rights via (or vis-à-vis) Brussels.

As has been hinted at, the revenue structure of most big clubs in Austria has been characterised throughout the last decade by a special feature, i.e. the financial backing by a large sponsor, which in turn means the establishment of structures of patronage. According to Deloitte, 60 percent of the football league members’ revenues derive from sponsoring (season 2007-8), which represents the highest number among ten researched Western European leagues (Sinnreich 2009: 49). Thus, to reach (inter)national competitiveness, big clubs such as Sturm Graz, Austria Vienna and Red Bull Salzburg have come to rely on personal sponsors: Hannes Kartnig, Frank Stronach and Dietrich Mateschitz, who for very different reasons and
with only slightly different ambitions, have pumped large sums into their respective clubs.\textsuperscript{24} This alternative source of income helps to explain why most Austrian clubs do not have the issue of broadcasting rights (and plans to generate much more from them via a decentralised system) high on their priority list.

\section*{Champions League, UEFA Cup and transnational club fora}

Club competition at the European level, especially the Champions League, has been identified with regard to other leagues in Europe, such as the German Bundesliga, as a crucial dimension of Europeanisation. That is because throughout the 1990s participation and success in these competitions has proven financially very lucrative and has shown to have quite a considerable impact on the symbolic level (as regards image and reputation). Additionally, one can interpret the relatively dense networks that are established through regular competition across borders as a mechanism that may alter the general patterns of orientation not only of the club’s representatives, but also of the supporters/spectators, arguably leading to more Europeanised mind sets, at least a stronger focus on the ‘European dimension’.

With regard to Austrian football, one has to recognise that at least the Champions League is rather like the exception to the rule (of non-participation). Only three Austrian clubs have played in the group stages of the Champions League so far\textsuperscript{25}, and only once an Austrian team has made it to the then-existing second (group) stage: Sturm Graz in the 2000-1-season. The Champions League for the most part remains a distant dream, a miracle panacea. To count on participation in the League’s group stage can be a (very) risky undertaking for Austrian clubs, as the example of FC Tirol in 2001 indicates: the club, which was burdened with a mortal debt, banked on reaching this very group stage. Shortly after it failed to get the better of Lokomotiv
Moscow in the last qualifying round it had to file for bankruptcy (Adrian and Schächtele 2008: 165-67).

Even though the structure of revenues/financing of clubs differs markedly from that of other European leagues, especially with regard to the very substantial reliance of some of the big clubs upon the patronage system described above, participation in European football (still) substantially enhances the competitiveness of Austrian clubs. This is only reinforced by the fact that relatively low revenues emanate from the broadcasting right deals.

Thus, although the European club competitions may not be so much part of clubs’ budget calculations (since it cannot be taken for granted to reach the financially lucrative stage of these competitions at all), participation in these tournaments is nevertheless what the more ambitious, competitive and/or traditional Austrian Bundesliga clubs, such as Red Bull Salzburg, Rapid Vienna and Austria Vienna are heading for. In this regard, as has been said, participation in the (group stage of the) Champions League would be like hitting the jack-pot; the revenue of € 13 million generated by Sturm Graz through making it to the group stage of the Champions League in 2000-1 alone (Kurier 26.4.2009: 32) was bigger than the entire annual budgets of most Austrian professional clubs at that time. This brings a clear competitive advantage for national competitions, although Sturm did not profit from it due to speculative and unsuccessful transfers and higher personnel costs.

But also the UEFA Cup/Europa League can be financially lucrative to Austrian clubs, as the example of Austria Vienna that reached the quarter final of the UEFA Cup in 2004-5 indicates. But in the former UEFA Cup the financial aspect, more than in the CL (where participation in the group stage is already rewarded with very significant revenues), has been much linked to how far one gets in the
competition. With the new Europa League this is supposed to change, since appearance in the group stage (for which one still needs to qualify however) would be more lucrative than for the old UEFA Cup group stage, with higher guaranteed revenues. In the season 2008-9 four Austrian clubs entered the group stage of the Europa League, thus gaining a minimum of guaranteed € 900,000 from UEFA, with additional €120,000 per victory and €60,000 for a draw, and considerable revenues from ticket sales and television rights. Nevertheless, participation and success in the UEFA Cup throughout the last seasons indicate that this is really an extra for Austrian clubs, not a regular and normal undertaking to be relied upon, to be in the regular calculation even of the big clubs.  

Finally, and largely resembling the small visibility of Austrian clubs in European competitions, there has not been a detectable Austrian contribution to transnational club fora. No Austrian club has been member of the G-14, while these days, because each European association is represented there, three Austrian clubs belong to the European Club Association (ECA) that is officially recognised by UEFA (see the chapters on UEFA and Germany in this volume). It remains, however, an open question whether the ECA will be an effective instrument especially for smaller countries/associations, let alone a venue characterised by frequent contact and at least partially converging expectations and mind-sets of its participants. In summary, due to the lesser involvement in European club tournaments and only marginal exposure of Austrian clubs at the transnational level, some of the Europeanisation mechanisms detectable in the German case simply do not exist in any meaningful sense in the Austrian case.

Conclusion
In sum, if one is to speak of any Europeanisation of Austrian football, such dynamics have been most visible in two dimensions: the Central European heritage of Viennese football that clearly predates Bosman, and the nationality issue in Austrian football which has become a focal point of debates and policies in the wake of the Bosman ruling. In some respects, Austrian football has thus been more internationally oriented, albeit regionally bound to the Central European space; as regards the composition of the teams and the transboundary contacts and alignments of clubs and football associations, it has been (Central) ‘Europeanised’ since the first half of the 20th century. The Bosman ruling thus altered a nationality system that was already fairly multi-national; with its mixture of progressive liberalisation and counter measures to advance national talents, advocated by media discourse and backed by right-wing populist politicians, Austrian football has nevertheless undergone a substantial transformation post-Bosman.

Its mid 1990-status as a new player and a small country within the EU (and the fact that its regional heritage as Central European power in football did not match the political space of the EU then) have contributed to the fact that Austrian actors have obviously had rather limited interest in and impact on sports policy-making at EU level. The absence of a marked dualism between the big Austrian clubs and the national association further hampered any activism of relevant actors to go to Brussels. Broadcasting rights never became a prominent issue of debate, not least given the small amount of money to be earned in the Austrian market. The evolution of an alternative revenue structure for some of the big clubs – the patronage system – only indicates that to become internationally competitive, the issue of centralised vs. decentralised marketing of broadcasting rights is not of paramount importance.
Participation of Austrian clubs in European tournaments has become sporadic in the last years, arguably contributing to the invisibility of Austrian clubs and their representatives in European club fora. Given its heritage as a founder of Central European football as transboundary activity in the first half of the 20th century, Austrian football has become more inward-oriented, less visible and only minimally involved in European-wide transboundary groupings. Thus, some of the Europeanising mechanisms observable in other countries (the impact of the Champions League on clubs’ strategies as well as spectators’ orientations; activism of clubs’ representatives in transnational club fora) are hardly relevant for the Austrian case by now.

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1 The authors would like to thank David Ranc and Borja García for their helpful comments on the first draft of this paper and Barbara Liegl (Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights) for her expertise. People with intimate knowledge of Austrian football have contributed via background interviews and other help: thanks to Klaus Federmair, Clemens Geyer and Reinhard Krennhuber (all of the Austrian football magazine ballesterer) as well as Peter Klinglmüller, press officer of the Austrian Football Association, and Christian Kircher, public relations chief of the Austrian Football League (Bundesliga).
2 Especially since the 1960s and the founding of the German Bundesliga, there is a strong interconnection between the Austrian football market and the German market. 29.8 percent of foreign coaches and 15 percent of all foreign players in Austria’s top league (1945-2008) came from Germany (Liegl/Spitaler 2009: 245-6), thus ranking first and second in the respective categories. Austrian players and managers were already hired by German clubs since the interwar era.
3 As Marschik (1998: 20) points out: “After 1918 [...] no feeling of national identity developed. Neither the people nor the political parties believed that this country would survive. [...] Vienna felt like a big city and center without any hinterland...”. In this situation of ‘non-nationality’, the make-up of the central space – Vienna – as regards its ethnic composition becomes interesting, because the city itself was arguably far more metropolitan in the original sense of the word, i.e. internationalised.
4 On Meisl, see also Hafer/Hafer (2007).
5 ‘Mitropa’ refers to the German word for Central Europe (Mitteleuropa).
6 See on both the excellent description in Marschik (2001).
7 This paragraph and the following ones mainly draw on Liegl and Spitaler (2009).
8 Nevertheless, there have been waves of foreign immigration to Austrian football, not least from the neighbouring Central European states, most notably the inflow of Hungarian players in the aftermath of the 1956 failed uprising in Hungary (Spitaler 2006-07), and the continuous migratory movement of players from former Yugoslavia, especially since the early 1960s (Radojev and Spitaler 2008).
9 This, as a general trend from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, is confirmed at least partially by the data in Liegl and Spitaler (2008: 27), which point to a ratio of 80 to 85 per cent of players from neighboring/Central and Eastern European countries as share of all foreign-born players in Austrian top league football, while this ratio decreased in the following years to levels of around 65 to 75 per cent.
10 Since 1976 the employment of non-national football professionals (as of all other migrant workers) was subject to the Federal Act on the Employment of Foreigners (Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz, BGBl. 218/1975). Due to the public interest work permits for football players were normally granted more easily by the public authorities than in some other sectors of employment.
11 Research has so far not produced any significant result as to whether there has been some forward thinking on behalf of Austrian actors in terms of preempting legal action taken by non-EU players on the grounds of discrimination via further liberalisation.

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and Rapid Vienna once). Graz twice, Austria Salzburg in 1994 (25 League). not only to become the top Austrian team, but to be competitive at the European level (Champions promotion to marketing efforts on behalf of a company, the ambitions were and are almo talented young Austrian players going abroad. Austrian clubs have also made considerable revenues out of player transf television revenues represent 12 per cent of the overall budget of 15 million (season 2008–2009b) – the percentage of ticket sales and merchandising will be higher. Recently, some Austrian clubs have also made considerable revenues out of player transfers, with a new generation of talented young Austrian players going abroad. For a good account, see Adrian/Schächtele (2008: 135–60). The reasons might range from self-promotion to marketing efforts on behalf of a company, the ambitions were and are almost identical: not only to become the top Austrian team, but to be competitive at the European level (Champions League).

Throughout the last decade, only four attempts to reach the group stage have been successful (Sturm Graz twice, Austria Salzburg in 1994–95 and Rapid Vienna in 2005–6), all other teams did not overcome the qualification stage (Austria Vienna twice, Grazer AK twice, Red Bull/FC Salzburg twice and Rapid Vienna once).
Club representatives gave estimates of €4 million revenues for the UEFA-Cup-season 2004-5 (including television rights and ticket sales) before taxes (Neue Kronen Zeitung 9.4.2005: 90). Throughout the last ten years (1999-2000-season until 2008-9), Austrian teams have qualified 31 times for the first round of UEFA Cup. During the first five years, without the group stage as second round, only once a team made it to the third round (the qualification of Sturm Graz via the Champions League in 1999-2000 is not counted here). In most cases, the Austrian team did not even reach the second round. Since 2004, when the second round became a (financially at least potentially lucrative) group stage, this stage was only reached four times, while nine times the Austrian teams failed in the first round. The single and by this exceptional case where an Austrian team made it into the quarter finals during the last decade was Austria Vienna in the 2004-5-season. At the moment it seems unlikely for Austrian clubs to repeat successful runs to European cup competitions’ finals, as they were managed by Austria Salzburg in the UEFA Cup (1993-94) or Austria Vienna (1977-78) and Rapid Vienna (1984-85, 1995-96) in the Cup Winners’ Cup. As of today, these are Austria and Rapid Vienna and the Grazer AK.

To date, no data/systematic studies of fans’ attitudes in this regard exist. One of the exceptions concerning researching fans in Austria at all is the comparative study of Waddington/Malcolm/Horak (1998). An exception might be the reputation of Rapid Vienna’s Ultras for their passionate support among European (or at least German speaking) Ultrà-groups and their networking with other European Ultrà fan groups.
References


Figure 10.1  Shares of foreign players according to their country of origin

 Shares of foreign players according to their country of origin (European Union, EFTA + Switzerland, Third-Country-Nationals) in Austrian football (First League), 1986-2007