

## **The European Union as a leading role in international climate policy - fact or fiction? An Analysis of the 19th UN Climate Change Conference in Warsaw**

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Climate change has become one of the biggest challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Factors such as the economic crisis, a growing gap between old and new EU Member States, the increasing importance of emerging markets like China and India, as well as the return of the United States to the climate negotiations contest the pioneering role of the EU in climate protection. This problem represents the question of my study: does the leadership role of European Union (EU) in international climate policy conform to a fact or a fiction? The empirical plausibility of a European "leadership" role will be examined. To what extent can - and will - the EU meet such a role?

Natural disasters, water shortages and heat waves are just some of the consequences of climate change which we are increasingly confronted with and which will occur in the future. Climate change is global, it constantly changes our world. Therefore, climate protection needs to be global, too. The fifth assessment report of the "Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change" (IPCC) , published in April 2014, illustrates this relationship between climate change and protection: the past thirty years at an average have been warmer than all preceding decades since 1850, the sea level has been rising, and the amounts of ice are decreasing. Concentrations of carbon dioxide and methane have increased to values not yet seen. In order to avoid those consequences, a profound change of economy and society is crucial. Through environmental policies, climate change can be limited to a tolerable level.

However, this requires a climate change policy at national and international level. According to the European Union, climate change can only be tackled multilaterally with all countries involved, especially the industrialized countries (European Commission 2002). In the last two decades, the EU with a total of 28 Member States, has been active in in this process and played a leading role in the negotiations. As a global player in international climate policy the EU has shown a high level of commitment since the 1990s, especially by submitting policy proposals and recommendations concerning biotechnology, the protection of the ozone layer or environmental reforms of the United Nations (UN) system (Oberthür, 2008: 49). The EU has positioned itself as a pioneer in particular in the Kyoto negotiations. The emission reduction target of 15 per cent by 2010 compared to 1990 levels was indeed considered as unrealistic by other developed countries, but the Union remained steadfast and focused on the establishment of in the Emissions trading systems in the turn of the new

millennium. In 2007, heads of State and Government of the EU announced the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of 20 percent by 2020 and -provided that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable reductions - even to 30 percent. At this time, no similar ambitious commitments could be seen by other industrialized countries. In the run-up to Copenhagen in 2009, the Union has indeed taken in a "Leadership" -role with mitigation efforts such as these. Since the Copenhagen conference, however, where the Union did not know how to prevent a weak performance, European climate policy has been stagnating. High expectations are set on the Paris Summit in 2015, where goals should be set final and binding.

The approach of my thesis will be structured as followed: The first chapter deals with climate change as a political subject, which has developed rapidly – both on the international and European level. This should provide a first overview on climate change policy, with the importance of this theme being emphasized.

Then the analytical framework of this thesis will be presented, which consists of the "leadership" - and "actorness" concept. The understanding of the "Leadership" role is an important factor to better conceive the constraints and opportunities that may arise in certain negotiations. Since the 1990s, numerous concepts of "leadership" have been discussed in the academic community which intend to assess the performance of the actors in international regimes. Then I will go into the classification of Grubb / Gupta, who explicitly refer to climate negotiations. In this thesis, it should be said that effective leadership is only given once all the criteria, which is will present, have been met. It is this statement which should be examined in this essay in order to answer to the question. With the "actorness" concept it should be assessed whether the EU is a standalone player. This is particularly relevant for this thesis as the role of the EU especially in the climate negotiations is not easy to detect, and is not considered independent of its identity and characteristics. The Union is a "project under construction" and its actorness quality therefore an interaction of many factors, both internal and external, which allow or restrict EU measures.

In addition to the "actorness" concept, the EU's status as a player in world politics will be assessed. In another section, the European Environment and climate change policy is analyzed based on these concepts. Finally, with the UN climate conference in Warsaw in November 2013, the case-study of this thesis will be analyzed: What were the goals set out by the EU? Which results had been delivered? Like many conferences, the Warsaw Summit has been seen as a significant test for the EU's ability to act on the world stage. Six months after the conference, it is time to evaluate this ability. Extensive analyzes will probably will

be published in a few months. Therefore, the information given in this paper is based on media and press releases published shortly before or after the conference.

Finally, the question whether the European leadership role is a fact or a fiction should be answered and an outlook on future global climate change policy will be given.

### **Climate issues in international politics**

In the last three decades, the climate issue developed from a scientific topic to a subject of "high politics" (Oberthür / Roche-Kelly, 2008; Jordan 2010). Beginning in the 1960s, climate politics were mainly characterized by a (natural) scientific discourse. A shift within the agenda could be seen especially in the 1970s. Global warming became a buzzword that was not only of interest to scientists, but also became increasingly relevant from a political point of view. Environmental problems which are associated with industrialization, such as global warming and air pollution, made political action all the more necessary. Various international conferences and general meetings of the United Nations since then deal with climate change and its consequences. The increasing importance of climate change and environmental protection ultimately led to the creation of an international climate regime. This regime is still characterized by an active environmental policy, which allows the states to tackle environmental problems cooperatively (Gehring / Oberthür, 1997: 10).

Even with the global economic recession in the late 2000s, climate change remained a central political issue in most industrialized countries. Although the Kyoto Protocol came in place only in 2005, already two years later the States of the Conference of the Parties gathered in Bali to discuss post-Kyoto climate targets (Purvis / Stevenson 2010: 4). They decided on long-term cooperative action, including a global goal for emission reductions. Issues such as adaptation, technological cooperation and climate finance should also play a role. Therefore, it was hoped that the climate summit in Copenhagen would give direction.

But the conference only ended with a minimal consensus: reducing global warming to less than 2 ° C compared to pre-industrial levels. Concrete measures to this end were not delivered. This so-called "Copenhagen Accord" was not even officially signed, but "taken note" of by the conference participants only (Purvis / Stevenson 2010: 4). The decision represents what has been observed for a long time: developed by the major states altogether, the consensus is little more than the lowest common denominator (Falkner / Stephan / Vogler 2010: 252). The Copenhagen conference, which was followed by climate talks in Cancun, Durban, Doha and Warsaw were able to demonstrate that the international

community is capable of acting, but on the other hand only were an intermediate step on the way to a binding agreement which is to be decided before 2015.

It should now be investigated how the supposed leadership of the Union can best be conceptualized and how far - based on these concepts- the EU corresponds with such a role. The following sections relate to these questions. First, the "leadership" concept will be presented as the backbone of this essay together with its associated criteria. Then, the "actorness" -concept will be analyzed and the EU's quality as an actor identified. Based on these features, it can be judged whether the view that the EU holds a leading role equates a fact or a fiction and how the EU acted as an actor in the climate negotiations.

### **The "leadership" concept**

*"The concept of leadership has a number of relevant meanings. It is associated with rule and dominance [...] presence and negotiating strength in multilateral environmental regimes. . . Yet it can mean so to guide, to go ahead or even to aspire "(Bretherton / Vogler 2006: 103)*

In this quote, it can be seen that "leadership" is associated with various forms and manifestations. In numerous scientific papers is stated that "leadership" decides whether international problems are addressed with success or failure (Parker / Karlsson 2010: 3). The EU, which in this paper should be considered as an *actor*, has often emphasized its role as a leader in international climate change (see Chapter 4). But how do you design "leadership"? Currently, there are three influential elaborations, which deal with the "leadership" -topic and resulted in a fourth concept: Oran R. Young (1991) was the first to elaborate a "leadership" -Typology, being followed by A. Underdal (1992) and Raino Malnes (1995). Its special feature is the reference to regime formation, multilateral negotiations and solutions to collective problems. Grubb and Gupta (2000) finally summarize the findings of these three authors together in a separate concept. They examine "leadership" in particular with regard to the development of the climate regime and international climate negotiations. Therefore, this approach should be taken as a theoretical base. But first, a brief overview of the concepts development should be given.

### **"Leadership" concepts within the scientific literature**

How does an actor operate, when he tries to take a leadership role? Although the scientific literature shows us varying concepts of "leadership", they can be reduced to three kinds: a) based on resources, b) giving an example and c) based on ideas (see, Parker / Karlsson 2010): "leadership" is resource based when the actor uses diplomatic or economic resources. Young (1991: 288) refers to this type as "structural leadership" in which the

structural power depends on the material resources of "leaders". Such leadership can be performed through coercion or incentives. Financial and / or technical promise represent a strategy to bring about cooperation (Underdal 1992: 8). The second form of "leadership" is based on the fact that the leading actor commits itself to certain measures and thereby demonstrates a "good example". Underdal (1992: 4) also refers to this as "unilateral leadership" in which the actor is trying to solve a collective problem by its own efforts and thus sets the pace. But Underdal stresses that "cheap talk", the mere rhetoric, is not enough. It is required to take credible action that can be effectively implemented. Malnes (1995: 92) believes that such a leadership role influences others to do what they would otherwise not have done. Thus, with this type of "leadership", the actor can exert great influence and at the same time pursue a common goal.

The third type of "leadership" is based on ideas. Problems are specifically named and specific solutions are sought for. The "leader" draws attention to these problems by agenda-setting, so that certain topics are specifically responded to. With intellectual capital, i.e. ideas or visions, impact is taken on negotiations (Young 1991: 298). The "leader" works at a different time level, as "intellectual leadership" is considered to be a deliberative and reflective process and ideas vary before or after negotiations. Underdal (1992: 9) connects this form with characteristics such as "skills, energy and status".

### **Grubb and Gupta**

Grubb and Gupta (2000) develop an approach based on Young and the subsequent discussion. In their publication, "Climate Change and European Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe?" they discuss how the European Union as a political unit exercises international leadership and apply their model - as a complement to concepts already shown - on climate policy.

In their opinion, "leadership" is necessary in order to facilitate effective global action. However, they argue that the EU needs to define a clear leadership role for itself, with its own political and institutional conditions which should be compatible and therefore legitimate, credible and effective (Grubb / Gupta 2000: 4). They name three reasons why there is a need for "leadership" (ibid.: 9): First, there could a big gap between signing a contract and its final ratification, secondly, it is not always certain whether and how countries meet their obligations and, thirdly, many specific questions relating to the contractual structure often remain unanswered. An effective form of "leadership" is given when large differences between developed and developing countries are taken into account, especially in the context of sustainable development (ibid.: 23). A central argument made by

the authors is the statement that global sustainability requires EU leadership because "Only Europe can provide the much needed leadership that is required" (Grubb / Gupta 2000: 295).

Looking at the European climate policy, a deeper understanding of the various "leadership" is necessary. Therefore, they divide the concept in a following typology: "structural", "instrumental" and "directional" (Grubb / Gupta 2000: 18).

"Structural leadership" according to Grubb / Gupta (2000: 19) is **"associated with the exercise of power derived from political strength in the global order and the weight of an actor with respect to the problem at hand."** With this definition, the authors refer to the size of the EU and its 28 Member States. For two reasons the Union may apply a structural leadership role: first, it can exert direct influence on the (new) member countries and secondly, it can increase - in the case of an agreement - both the population and the gross domestic product (GDP). In relation to climate change can this form of "Leadership" can be measured by the amount of current and future emissions. These may be signs of growing prosperity and thus higher material resources (Edenhofer et al 2010: 14).

The authors credit the EU with "structural leadership", however, due to the internal and external constraints, the exercise of this role is limited. These limitations arise out of the fact that voting procedures within the council are often time-consuming due to the unanimous approval and usually only the lowest common denominator is found (Gupta / Ringius 2001: 286). Structural leadership therefore is not only a question of physical or economic resources, but also refers to the way in which an attempt is made to set incentives for cooperation (Gupta / Ringius 2001: 282).

"Instrumental leadership", which is connected to the actual negotiation process, is described by the authors as **"the exercise of skill in negotiations and the closely related question of the instrumental design of the regime to accommodate the needs of different parties"** (ibid.) This means, that the needs of the individual parties depend on the institutional design of a regime. The emissions trading market, which is intended to represent a market that satisfies all needs exemplifies this. This kind of "leadership" in the context of climate change must provide an assessment of the fundamental and long-term interests of the various parties. Especially at the international level, the central importance of long-term distribution issues needs to be underlined (Grubb / Gupta 2000: 20).

In terms of "directional leadership" the authors also speak of "leadership by example", where domestic policies and their implementation play a dominant role. This should clarify that a goal is actually achievable. The actor is not only "ahead of the crowd", but also

influences the behavior of others, by attempting to solve problems (ibid.) He takes action and has a significant impact on the outcome of negotiations. The actor is trying to convince others of the need for action, focusing on "dissemination internationally" (Grubb / Gupta 2000: 21). An important role is played by ideas which relate to knowledge, cognitive dimensions, paradigms and worldviews. With these ideas the actor tries to influence the perception of others (ibid. : 23). Another crucial factor is how the actions match with the previous rhetoric. The authors emphasize that these types of "leadership" are indeed different, but not mutually exclusive.

### **Actorness of the European Union**

What does it mean to be a "global actor" or a "global player"? The EU is defined by Bretherton and Vogler (2006), as an actor sui generis. This character, according to the authors, is a major challenge for scientists of international relations (IR). We need to see the EU as an international actor in order to accurately reflect the impact of its activities. Although since 1999 the EU has gained more and more political significance and political influence, the EU's role in world politics is still underestimated and neglected. Bretherton and Vogler (2006: 13) see the Union as part of an evolving global system with a multitude of actors. Jupille and Caporaso (1998) have no doubt that the Union is omnipresent in global environmental politics. Although there are several contributions to the "actorness" concept of the EU (see also Sjöstedt, 1977; Ginsberg 1999, Groen and empty Schaik 2007), my thesis should concentrate on the concept of Jupille and Caporaso (1998), otherwise the frame would be exceeded.

The criteria presented in the above mentioned study on the role of the EU are more applicable than the elements of Bretherton and Vogler, whose analysis is "vague and too encompassing" (Niemann / Groen, 2011: 6). In addition, the EU's changing role can better understood.

The basic premise of Jupille and Caporaso is the statement that an assessment of the EU in world politics raises some empirical challenges (Jupille / Caporaso 1998: 213). In their point of view, the criteria for determining the status of the EU are unclear due to its diverse nature, and also the EU's commitment varies in relation to the different problems and issues. Therefore, in order to analyze the role of the EU in foreign policy, the authors distinguish between four criteria for the evaluation of the EU "Actorness" (Jupille / Caporaso 1998: 214 ff.): Recognition, Authority, Autonomy and Cohesion. These four features form a coherent whole.

**Recognition** is the acceptance and interaction with other states and / or international organizations, other members and third parties. This allows for presence in the global policy. Jupille and Caporaso distinguish between de jure and de facto recognition. De jure describes the diplomatic or international recognition and a formal membership in organizations. These include, for example, the EU membership of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. However, Jupille and Caporaso say that only externalities are not sufficient to meet the criterion of recognition, but it is rather the interactions of third parties with the EU. Here the authors come their next point, the de facto recognition. This is given if others choose to interact with the EU as a whole, not just its individual Member States. By the participation of the European Union in international climate negotiations it can thus ensure a de facto recognition.

**Authority** describes how the EU can act "outside" and with which competence it acts in a particular subject. It is imposed on the EU by its Member States. Authority is created by a contract between the customer ("principal") and agents. Through this relationship the intermediary can act effectively. This can best be seen from the contracts, such as the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which have awarded the European Community the largest authority so far. Through the Single European Act in 1987, the EU's legal competence in environmental policy was strengthened.

**Autonomy** refers to the institutional characteristics of the EU in international negotiations. Jupille and Caporaso divide the term in distinctiveness and independence. Distinctiveness describes, how the EU can act independently of its Member States. With independence it is meant to ensure that these organizations also make a difference. The indicators include decision making, goal setting and ultimately the degree of implementation. The European Union has a particularly high degree of autonomy, if it agrees on a common position, as demonstrated by the commitments to emission reductions. Example of independence are the so-called "mixed agreements", i.e. Arrangements to be decided between the EU, its Member States and one or more parties.

**Cohesion**, i.e. the political agreement, is the fourth criterion of Jupille and Caporaso and can be divided into four indicators: "value cohesion" describes the degree of common objectives and compliance, while "output cohesion" should be seen in the extent of success the formulation of joint policies. "Tactical cohesion", however, refers to the compromise and the availability of methods to adjust diverging goals. "Procedural cohesion" finally is related to how to overcome conflict issues and whether a consensus can be found.

## **Climate Conference in Warsaw**

The climate summit in Warsaw in November 2013 took place under the sign of a roadmap and thus a binding and ambitious agreement to the Paris Summit in 2015 (German Watch 2013). Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, highlighted the need for such an agreement in his opening speech: "[...] here in Warsaw, we have to build a crucial stepping stone" (UNFCCC 2013). He stressed the urgency to make progress, and for a climate treaty to be worked out in Paris. The resulting peer pressure led, similar to the climate summit in Copenhagen, only to a minimum consensus. Here, the negotiators agreed to submit their emission targets until the first quarter of next year.

Despite the low expectations, the summit ended with a disappointing result. This was also due to the host country Poland, which is seen as "the biggest brakeman of tackling climate change" (German Watch 2013). The coal conference, which was taking place parallel to the climate negotiations, enhanced Poland's reputation as a "coal Country" and highlighted the reduced role of the Union in climate policy. The latter strengthened by the state of Poland, where the government argues that the EU should not put inputs into the negotiations 2015 (ibid.). Sponsored by the heavy industry, the climate summit has shown that especially the fossil energy paralyzes the process toward climate-friendly policies (ibid). For countries such as Australia, Japan and Poland, the fossil industry is still pervasive. To comply with the schedule by 2015, however, strong signals, especially from the industrialized countries are necessary. These signals must also come from the EU as long as it wants to take its lead.

Overall, the Warsaw Summit should represent a pioneering momentum on the way to a new binding agreement that would define the global post-2020 climate, economic and development agendas (UNFCCC 2013). EU Commissioner Connie Hedegaard hoped that the summit would end with "important prerequisites for Paris 2015" and "strong commitments" to continue to accelerate emission reductions (European Commission 2013).

## **Structural leadership**

The Union is capable of exerting a structural leadership role solely by its size and importance in the world economy. At the conference in Warsaw, the EU could prove with financial commitments totaling seven trillion dollars that it has the potential to pursue structural leadership. Norway and the United Kingdom were participating in the commitments, with a total of 280 million US dollars for the REDDplus Agreement and further 105,200,000 US dollars for the Adaptation Fund to support developing countries (German Watch 2013). A delegate from Germany stressed that it was European money which had enabled the several

climate change initiatives such as the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund (Spiegel Online 2013).

Other European countries such as Sweden, Belgium and Germany also participated in the plans. Nevertheless, the question was how to finance Architecture for the REDDplus Agreement. An accord on a long-term support of REDDplus measures is still pending. As Andresen and Agrawala (2002: 49) emphasize the importance of "structural leadership" in Rio and Kyoto, so is the relevance of political and economic power in Warsaw.

Structural leadership is also marked by the provision of incentives. In a statement issued before the summit press release, the Union again confirmed the offer of 30 percent emissions reduction below 1990 levels if other industrialized countries also commit to comparable reductions (European Commission 2013). Here, the EU could fulfil the criterion of "exercise of skill in negotiations" according to Grubb / Gupta, which is necessary for "structural leadership". The EU called for countries like China to take more responsibility for emissions and called for another "push" towards the global agreement. Young, too, (1991) would speak of "structural leadership" because the Union sensibly implemented its diplomatic resources.

### **Instrumental leadership**

The climate summit in Warsaw was marred by disagreements between developed and developing countries. The EU, along with its "step-wise approach", could prove "instrumental leadership" by creating a solution or strategy to pave the way to a global agreement. Grubb / Gupta (2000: 288) argue, however, that the EU better exercises this kind of "leadership" in the direct negotiation process by forming coalitions with developing countries. But it is precisely this criterion which could not be met at the summit. On the contrary, instead of "winning coalitions" there were disputes, particularly on the subject of "loss and damage". The demand of the developing countries, not to set up the mechanism under an existing but under a new framework, clashed with fierce opposition of the industrialized countries, who dreaded high financial responsibilities. A compromise was found in the decision to negotiate in three years on "the structure, mandate and effectiveness" of the Warsaw mechanism (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2013).

Climate finance was another point of contention between developed and developing countries. The latter demanded that 70 billion US dollars should be accumulated already by 2016, but did not succeed. Instead the EU's reinforced its commitments already made in 2010 and on the assistance to the 100 billion US dollars (UNFCCC 2013).

Although financial commitments are part of an effective "leadership" role, the controversial topics between the developed and developing countries show that the EU has failed in particular in the "instrumental leadership" role. The proposal by the Union that each country should make reduction commitments by 2014 was considered as premature by the developing countries.

Instrumental "leadership" was thus challenged by internal disagreements: the host country Poland, which produces 90 percent of its electricity from coal, was again on the top of its reputation as "effective blocker" of EU climate politics. (German Watch 2013).

The frustration of about 800 NGO representatives culminated in a "walk-out", marking an event that was never occurred at a climate conference.

China, India, Venezuela were incensed due to the EU's proposal to set a timetable by 2015 (The Guardian 2013). They demanded more flexibility and insisted on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The criterion "to accommodate the needs of different parties" according to Grubb / Gupta, which includes "mutually beneficial solutions" could not be realized.

### **Directional leadership**

The Union intended to convince its negotiating partners of emission commitments and to agree on a timetable for the contract in 2015. This speaks for the EU's ambition, but not for "directional leadership". A pioneering leadership-role not only requires the mere rhetoric, but also the implementation of objectives. The summit, however, lacked such a "leadership" role: countries like Japan, Australia and Canada all overturned their climate targets (UNFCCC Webcast 2013). Japan, which initially committed itself to promises of 25 percent by 2020 compared to 1990, announced a reduction target of only 3.8 percent over its 2005 level. Thus, this would mean an increase in emissions of 3.1 percent. Australia decided for a similarly low commitment and Canada had already resigned the Kyoto Protocol the previous year (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2013). Kumi Naidoo, director of Greenpeace International, commented:

*"Along with backsliding by Japan, Australia and Canada, and the lack of meaningful leadership from other countries, governments here have delivered a slap in the face to those suffering as a result of dangerous climate change. The EU is being shackled by the Polish government and its friends in the coal industry, and must resume leading on the climate agenda if Paris is going to deliver a treaty that matters."* (Greenpeace 2013)

Other countries did not follow the EU's demand to announce climate change targets. However, the EU also needs these countries for a global agreement to be concluded. Therefore, the Union failed to convince others of the need for action – a criterion which is necessary for "directional leadership". Despite the ambition to create a clear timetable, the decision text only said that obligations are to be presented "well in advance" of the Paris Summit (UNFCCC 2013). An exact date was not mentioned. The EU could have exerted more pressure. Also, the fact that even the EU itself did not announce any new commitments points out for a trend-setting role- in deficit. The EU was even criticized for its lack of ambition to enter into further commitments, although the reduction target of 20 percent has almost been reached already.

Concerning the financial issues, the Union adapted a relatively conservative role and showed no definite way to how these promises could be satisfied- thus, substantial questions remained unanswered. The lack of pioneering ambitions worsened the degree of trust between developing countries and the EU even further. "Directional leadership" and its associated "leading by example" has therefore also failed, since the Union's credibility could not be substantiated. A reaction will probably be expected only in 2015 with the formulation of a treaty. Concrete measures within the EU would be necessary for a trend-setting leadership, however.

It can be seen that the EU's achievements are attributed more to a "structural leadership" role rather than an "instrumental" or "directional" kind of "leadership". Particularly through its financial commitments and diplomatic resources the Union managed to exercise its structural leadership. The EU's instrumental and pioneering position proved to be weakened. This was due to the fact that the Union has not succeeded in building "winning coalitions", on the other hand it can be attributed to the fact that a progressive behavior of the Union was prevented by host country Poland. The protest of NGOs such as Greenpeace, WWF and Friends of the Earth was directed against the Polish government, which organized the "Climate and Coal Summit" and simultaneously promoted for coal energy. In addition, no tightening emission reduction targets were made at the conference, which would, however, been considered as "leading by example".

### **Actorness**

In consideration of the criteria of Jupille and Caporaso - recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion - should now be assessed to what extent the EU qualified as an "actor" at COP 19 in Warsaw.

The criterion "recognition" can be confirmed, as the EU interacted with other actors and was accepted by them. In general it can be said that the EU has become an internationally recognized player. The EU, Norway and Mexico proposed to include international cooperation initiatives, such as pollution control (methane and hydro fluorocarbons). However, the final version of the Warsaw Convention does not mention this initiative.

Nevertheless, the will to cooperate can be understood as a confirmation of the "recognition" criterion. The bargaining power of the union however was relatively weak, since an increase in emission reduction had not been agreed.

The fact that the International Association of coal held a meeting parallel to the summit damaged the credibility of the Union, and in particular the one by the Polish president. The protests of environmentalists were not long in coming. However, the main obstacle for the EU to a stronger and more ambitious agreement cannot be found on the technical level of negotiations, but rather in a lack of political will of the parties for a more significant climate policy (German Watch 2013). In the absence of ambition of industrialized countries, i.e. the EU, countries such as Brazil and India found a justification to remain in their old patterns of negotiation rather than move forward their national climate policy. This should not remain without consequences: at the end of the summit Commissioner Connie Hedegaard expressed her frustration on the fact that no timetable has been set for Emissions reduction and blamed the developing countries - including China, India, Arabia and Malaysia. These, however, accused the EU in return of "seriously damaging the confidence and trust in the process" (The Guardian 2013). Facts such as these, and also that Poland – being dependent on coal industry and which was host of the conference- speak for a limited authority of the Union.

However, the Union was able to exert a little authority against Brazil. The proposal to consider the historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions was refused by the EU. While the view of the Union was to carry obligations equally, the developing countries emphasized historical responsibilities should not be ignored. Likewise, the Union rejected, "loss and damage" to be developed into a new funding mechanism. Due to this, the Union demonstrated an increased competence in effecting the negotiations. However, this cannot be considered directly as progressive, as a shrinking back from more responsibility and financial commitments cannot advance climate policy.

Concerning the autonomy with which the Union negotiated at the conference, a low degree can be observed. In particular, the objective of the decision-making and therefore the implementation were not ambitious enough. The autonomy was lessened by the fact that the

summit in Warsaw was only considered as an intermediate step to the Paris summit next year in the first place and should prepare the Climate Change Mandate. Consequently, the decision latitude, which is a crucial criterion for autonomy, was limited.

As a result of this limitation, the EU could not fully meet the criterion of "cohesion". Especially "value cohesion", i.e. the degree of common goals and "output cohesion", which describes the degree of success in the formulation of common policies, left EU activities to be desired. These two criteria were weakened by the fact that the proposal of the EU, to already commit to emissions reductions this year, was rejected by the emerging markets. With the described "step-wise approach" the Union was able to perform "tactical cohesion" and "procedural cohesion" because the targets were matched to each other and a proposal has been made on how to solve conflict issues.

A lack of cohesion could be especially be remarked within the European institutions (Bellona 2013): while the European Parliament took a relatively clear position in the negotiations, the European Commission (see the resolution of the European Parliament), pointed to the complexity of the issues which were associated with divergent insights. In the mentioned resolution, which was adopted in late October 2013, the members of the European Parliament introduced their position. A clear and binding timetable towards a global agreement in 2015 was being demanded. The MPs called for a further reinforced climate ambition in the industrial sector.

In view of these facts, it can be summarized that the EU's performance was "something out of a mixed bag" (Oberthür / Groen 2013: 4). Although the EU has committed to financial suggestions and presented its "step-wise approach", the objectives were relatively moderate and a lack of a clearly defined leadership role could be seen.

## **Conclusion**

To conclude, it can be said that the EU was not in a position to exercise a clear leadership role and could therefore do not meet the criteria for an effective pioneer. The EU's actor-quality was significantly weakened, which thus can be seen as a reason for the decreased leading role. The vague final document of the summit contains no exact date for the emission commitments. However, that would have been a sign of effective leadership. In addition, the climate summit in Warsaw ended with many open questions, such as reduction commitments and also concerning the 2-degree target. The disappointing result can be attributed not only to the host country Poland, but also to the general lack of ambition, largely caused by industrialized countries. Japan, Kanda and Australia took all take a step

back rather than forward their climate policy. It seems that many states would play for time, not least the EU.

In the short term, it is necessary that the EU retains its climate change efforts (provided is a reduction of emissions by 40 percent by 2030 compared to 1990) retains and does not declare setbacks such as Japan. Emission reductions of 55 percent in order to meet the two-degree target would be necessary. In the medium term, the Union must reform the emissions trading because the certificates are too cheap and electricity from coal and therefore cheaper. In the long term, the EU must ensure that the target of 80 to 95 percent emission reduction can actually be achieved. These include increasing investments in climate-friendly and energy-efficient technologies. All these elements are part of the global climate agreement. Overall, more dynamic with ambitious objectives and specific strategies in the climate negotiations will be needed for the EU to regain its leadership role.

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