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Nils D. Steiner, University of Mainz

Paper No. 7





### Mainz Papers on International and European Politics (MPIEP) ISSN: 2193-6684

Edited by the Chair of International Relations, University of Mainz

Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz Department of Political Science Chair of International Relations

Georg Forster-Building D-55099 Mainz Phone: +49 (0)6131-39-21051 Fax: +49 (0)6131-39-27109 E-mail: mpiep@uni-mainz.de http://international.politics.uni-mainz.de/

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Steiner, Nils D. (2014): Economic Globalisation, the Perceived Room to Manoeuvre of National Governments, and Electoral Participation: Evidence from the 2001 British General Election, 2014/02. Mainz: Chair of International Relations, Johannes Gutenberg University.

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**Nils D. Steiner** is researcher and lecturer at the University of Mainz steiner@politik.uni-mainz.de

## Economic Globalisation, the Perceived Room to Manoeuvre of National Governments, and Electoral Participation: Evidence from the 2001 British General Election

Nils D. Steiner

### Abstract

Recent macro-level research argues that economic globalisation negatively affects electoral turnout by constraining the leeway of national governments and thereby rendering elections less meaningful to voters. This article analyses the link between perceptions of the national government's room to manoeuvre and voter turnout on the individual level. Drawing on the 2001 British General Election, it is shown that citizens who believe that economic globalization leaves the national government with less influence on the economy are less likely to report to have voted. Further findings also support the proposed theoretical model according to which room to manoeuvre perceptions affect turnout via views on the importance of elections and matter specifically for citizens that tend towards the left side of the left-right scale.

Keywords: economic globalisation; room to manoeuvre; electoral participation; voter turnout; 2001 British General Election.

### 1. Introduction

Many observers believe that economic globalization diminishes the room to manoeuvre of national governments as integration into the international economy puts pressures on national governments to preserve the competitiveness of their economies. Evidence consistent with this claim is, for example, obtained from studies on tax competition showing that tax policies seem increasingly shaped by efficiency considerations in an effort to prevent the flight of mobile tax sources and to remain economically competitive in international markets (e.g. Ganghof 2006; Genschel and Schwarz 2013; Plümper et al. 2009). Other scholars, however, have questioned whether economic globalization poses a fundamental threat to the welfare states of developed democracies pointing to their general resilience in an era of economic globalization (e.g. Garrett 1998). While the precise extent to which economic globalisation constrains national policy autonomy remains an open question to be investigated in future research, the available evidence, nonetheless, seems to support the view that it puts at least some real pressures on the policies national governments can efficiently pursue in certain respects and areas.

More recently, researchers have turned to investigate the repercussions economic globalisation's real or perceived consequences for national policy-making might have on mass publics and especially voting behaviour (e.g. Duch and Stevenson 2006; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Hellwig 2014). Building on the notion that economic globalisation has diminished the leeway national governments enjoy with regard to choosing economic policies, recent research within this literature develops the argument that economic globalisation has negative consequences for electoral turnout (Franklin 2004: 179; Hellwig and Samuels 2007: 299; Marshall and Fisher, forthcoming; Norris 2002: 217; Steiner 2010). As citizens are exposed to the idea that competitive pressures significantly constrain what governments are able to achieve in terms of economic policy outcomes these individuals care about, they might reason that it makes less of a difference who gets elected. Viewing elections as less meaningful in this sense, citizens might actually participate less in elections. Previous research has tested the resulting hypothesis that turnout is lower in more globalised settings with aggregate level data on national elections in established democracies: Employing different estimation techniques, Marshall/Fisher (forthcoming) and Steiner (2010) converge on the finding that economic globalisation, indeed, diminishes turnout.

These studies, however, only test for the association of the two ends of what is arguably a long causal chain. Moreover, as aggregate level studies with time-series cross-sectional datasets they are specifically open to the problem of specification uncertainty (see King and Zeng 2006; Plümper et al. 2005; Wilson and Butler 2007). It thus seems essential to supplement the existing evidence with an investigation into the mechanisms on the individual level. No previous research, however, examines whether citizen's individual beliefs concerning the constraints emanating from economic integration actually matter for their turnout decisions. This seems a critical omission as any association between globalisation and turnout must necessarily be established through the thoughts and actions of individual citizens.

This article thus considers the role of perceptions of the national government's room to manoeuvre (henceforth abbreviated: rtm) under conditions of global economic integration as a mediating factor linking economic globalisation and turnout. It explores the effect of rtm perceptions on electoral turnout on the individual level: Do individual perceptions that national governments enjoy less leeway under economic globalisation lead to a lower inclination to vote? While researchers have studied whether rtm perceptions affect economic voting (e.g. Duch and Stevenson 2006; Hellwig and Samuels 2007), so far a micro-level analysis with electoral turnout as a dependent variable is missing. As questions on perceptions of national sovereignty under economic globalisation have very rarely been asked in election surveys, a cross-national election survey properly suited for the present purpose is unavailable. As an alternative, this study draws on the case of the British General Election in 2001 and the British Election Panel Study 1997-2001 (Heath et al. 2002). As the incumbent Labour Party extensively referred to economic globalisation as an exogenous constraint, the idea of international market

integration constraining the rtm of national governments was particularly prominent in this context rendering this a suitable case for a first test of this contribution's main hypothesis.

The empirical findings establish that citizens who believe in less rtm are less likely to report to have voted. Further results also support additional observable implications of the theoretical model according to which rtm perceptions matter for the perceived importance of elections which in turn matter for turnout. Supplementary evidence suggests that these effects of perceived globalisation constraints are concentrated among citizens of the left and centre-left. Overall, the present article adds micro-level support to the argument that economic globalisation has negative consequences for electoral turnout and adds to the emerging literature on globalisation's electoral consequences.

The next section situates the present study in a broader theoretical discussion and literature review on the general mechanism that might link economic globalisation and electoral turnout. Drawing on established theoretical models of electoral turnout, the third section develops the main hypotheses in more detail. The fourth section gives a brief contextual overview on the 2001 British General Election. The fifth section introduces the data source and discusses the modelling strategy. The sixth section presents the empirical findings. A final section concludes.

### 2. Causal Paths from Economic Globalisation to Electoral Turnout: An Overall Model and Previous Findings

In this section, I develop a general model of the potential different causal pathways through which economic globalisation might affect electoral turnout and situate the present study within this broader framework. Figure 1 illustrates how economic globalisation might be thought to influence electoral turnout and differentiates analytically between two different causal pathways. The starting point of both pathways forms the macro-level phenomenon of economic globalisation, by which I mean the (process of increasing) integration of national economies into international markets, and the consequences for national steering capacity purportedly associated with the phenomenon. In the end, both paths converge on the idea that, on the micro-level of individual citizens, economic globalisation influences beliefs about the meaningfulness of elections in terms of whether elections are thought to potentially produce significant differences in outcomes. These attitudes on the relevance of elections in turn are assumed to affect electoral turnout on the individual level and then, by simple logic of aggregation, on the macro-level. The paths diverge with regard to how rtm constraints from economic globalisation are thought to affect beliefs about the meaningfulness of elections. While the path on the left-bottom is concerned with individual beliefs about decreases in the rtm of national governments (solid arrows); the path above and to the right of it assumes that economic globalisation affects turnout through the positioning of political parties and individual's reactions to these (dashed arrows). And while the latter 'party position-path' has already been examined in previous research; the main links of the alternative 'rtm perceptionpath' are unexamined so far and form the subject of the present contribution.

The path of rtm perceptions (solid arrows) depicts the argument already stated in the introduction and conforms to the theoretical model in Steiner (2010). The idea is that citizens' beliefs about the constraints for national economic policy brought about by economic globalisation mediate between economic globalisation and the perceived meaningfulness of elections and electoral turnout: As voters are exposed to the idea that competition in an economic policy outcomes these voters care about, they might reason that it makes less of a difference who gets elected. If voters are of the opinion that elections carry less meaning, they should be less likely to participate in elections. This argument linking, first, perceptions of the influence of the national government on the economy in a globalised world and views on the meaningfulness of elections and, second, perceptions of the meaningfulness of elections and turnout is the simple and intuitive main argument tested for the first time in

this article.<sup>1</sup> It might further be the case that individual beliefs on the government's rtm matter not equally to different individuals. Figure 1 incorporates this idea of a heterogeneous effect: It depicts the effect of rtm perceptions as being itself affected by the 'salience' of rtm perceptions to individuals. Section 3 will develop a specific version of this general argument by hypothesizing that rtm perceptions matter specifically for those on the left and centre-left.



Figure 1: Causal pathways from economic globalisation to electoral turnout

A second path (dashed arrows) operates through the positions of political parties. It has been argued elsewhere (Ezrow and Hellwig 2014; Steiner and Martin 2012; Ward et al. 2011) that economic globalisation activates structural pressures that stimulate a narrowing of party positions on economic policy issues with especially main left parties abandoning positions that seem too costly to pursue given the pressures of open markets and moving towards the centre. Ward et al. (2011) report evidence that the main left parties indeed seem to move to the centre under conditions of economic globalisation; Steiner and Martin (2012) observe less distinctiveness of parties' economic policy positions in more globalised contexts; Ezrow and Hellwig (2014) find that main parties are less responsive to the mean voter in countries more exposed to world markets. Assuming that parties' positional shifts are reflected in voters' perceptions, narrowing party positions are likely to impact upon individual voting behaviour. A wealth of evidence supports the view that aggregate turnout is higher in contexts where parties present more distinct policy alternatives (e.g. Dalton 2008; Wessels and Schmitt 2008). This aggregate relationship should extend to the individual citizen: As the positions of the main contending parties are perceived to be more distinct, voters should expect that who wins and who loses the election has larger consequences for outcomes. Voters should, thus, be less likely

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The present paper is not primarily concerned with the origins of beliefs about the government's influence on the economy in an economically integrated world and rather treats these as given beliefs that affect the inclination to vote. For work investigating into the macro-level determinants of rtm perceptions, see Duch and Stevenson (2006), Vowles (2008) and Hellwig (2010); on the individual level determinants, see Hellwig et al. (2008).

to participate in an election when they perceive the main contending parties to be rather similar in terms of economic policy positions.

This second causal path linking (a) economic globalisation and the convergence of party positions on economic policies and (b) the convergence of party positions and turnout was already tested and supported through aggregate data on elections and party positions in established democracies in Steiner/Martin (2012). Note that this proposed pathway offers an account of an impact of economic globalisation on individual turnout that does not require citizens to have any understanding of how economic globalisation brings competitive pressures that constrain the rtm of national policy-making. It is easy to see that for the proposed causal chain to hold, it is only required, as far as the micro-level is concerned, that citizens perceive a narrowing of party positions and react on this perception; no matter what the drivers of party convergence might actually be. The causal pathway tested in this article is distinct from this second causal path as it focusses on citizens' direct perceptions of the government's leeway in an economically interconnected world.<sup>2</sup>

Previous research has, thus, tested for the association between the two ends of these causal chains, i.e. the association of economic integration and electoral turnout on the macro-level (Marshall and Fisher forthcoming; Steiner 2010), and also for the causal path linking the two phenomena via party position taking (Steiner and Martin 2012). There is, however, no prior research that investigates into the question whether citizens' subjective beliefs about their government's effectiveness in an economically globalised world affect their individual inclination to vote. This seems to be a critical omission: As any association between globalisation and turnout must necessarily be established through the attitudes and actions of individual citizens, this should allow testing for such an association most directly. The present contribution therefore investigates (only) into the lower part of the causal path sketched on the bottom-left of figure 1 and analyses the repercussions of perceptions of a diminished rtm for voter participation on the individual level.

### 3. Hypotheses

Drawing on the model laid out in the previous section, this section develops the hypotheses to be tested in this contribution more closely. In a first step, it is briefly discussed how the main idea that the perceived rtm matters for voter turnout might be derived from established theoretical models of electoral participation.

One such model is the modified rational choice (RC) model of electoral turnout (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). According to the classical RC based 'calculus of voting' (Riker and Ordeshook 1968) the decision whether or not to participate in an election depends on perceived costs and benefits of voting where the benefits are understood as the difference in expected utility between the preferred and the rejected outcome of the election. Within this model, perceived constraints from economic integration can be conceptualised as affecting these perceived instrumental benefits of voting. As rational voters are ultimately interested in the substantial consequences of elections, these perceived instrumental benefits should depend on alternative expected policy outcomes under alternative results of the election. The key point is that if citizens believe that the influence of the government on economic outcomes is limited in the first place, it should matter less to citizens who is in power in terms of differences in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> By making a clear distinction between economic integration affecting turnout through (a) perceived differences between parties and (b) perceptions of the rtm figure 1 might oversimplify matters a bit. The analytical value of this distinction should be clear from the above. In reality, however, it might be the case that some citizens think of parties as being little different, *because* they believe the rtm to be constrained. On the other hand, citizens could infer from a perception of parties being little different that the rtm must be limited. There is, thus, certainly potential to further complicate figure 1 in an effort to make it more realistic. This would, however, involve costs in terms of parsimony and conceptual clarity and is not necessary for the present argument.

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outcomes and, by extension, in terms of differences in expected utility. In consequence, in the citizen's view it makes less of a difference who gets elected and the instrumental benefits of voting will tend to be smaller. As the instrumental benefits of voting are diminished, individuals should, according to the RC account of electoral participation, be less likely to participate in an election, everything else being equal.

This main idea that the perceived meaningfulness of elections in terms of whether they matter for outcomes is not alien to other theories of political participation. For example, the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) of political participation (Verba et al. 1995) incorporates the idea that external political efficacy, i.e. 'the feeling that political and social change is possible' (Campbell et al. 1954: 187), is a major determinant of political participation. Within this framework, beliefs about the government's rtm can, thus, be conceived as influencing the external efficacy of voting. As citizens believe that the national government's influence on the economy is limited in a globalised economy, they should view elections as less efficacious. As an individual regards an election as less efficacious, she should be less inclined to participate, according to the CVM.

While the present contribution is agnostic on the specific theoretical model behind it, it is clear that the following main hypothesis is plausible from different theoretical models of electoral or political participation:

H1: The more influence a citizen believes the national government to have under economic globalisation, the more likely is she to take part in a national election.

The arguments from both models also agree on the idea, depicted in figure 1, that perceptions on the national government's rtm affect electoral participation *through* beliefs about whether elections can result in meaningful differences. From the viewpoint of the RC model, beliefs about whether elections can result in meaningful differences are equivalent to instrumental benefits; from the CVM perspective, these beliefs are a measure of the external efficacy of voting. In accordance with the sequence depicted in figure 1, we can thus formulate two additional hypotheses that focus on the individual links of the assumed causal process:

H2: The more influence a citizen believes the national government to have under economic globalisation, the more likely is she to believe that a national election can produce meaningful differences.

H3: The more a citizen believes that a national election can produce meaningful differences, the more likely is she to vote.

The advantage of also testing for this mediation sequence empirically is that the model is tested in a more encompassing way. In fact, this is an application of King et al.'s (1994) guideline to test for several observable implications of a theory whenever possible in order to make the results more certain.

The discussion so far seems to implicitly assume that perceived constraints to the government's rtm matter equally for all citizens or, under an alternative more appropriate view, is concerned with an average effect of rtm perceptions. Potentially, the effect of rtm perceptions on the perceived meaningfulness of elections and on turnout is, however, contingent on the initial policy preferences an individual holds as individuals might care differently about the outputs and outcomes national government's are presumably less able to control under conditions of economic globalization. The specific hypothesis put forward here is that the turnout-dampening effect of perceived globalisation constraints is concentrated among voters of the centre-left and left; or in other words: that it is attenuated for those on the right. As the next section will make clearer, discourses in the UK about which policy options would not work, or work badly, under conditions of economic globalisation, focussed on traditional recipes of the mainstream left. Examples are redistribution through high taxation of corporations and rich individuals, a policy of generous welfare benefits not strongly relying on activation at the same time, strict labour market regulation meant to protect individual workers but potentially costly in terms of labour market flexibility or generally an economic policy

strategy that focusses on the demand side rather than on creating conditions conducive to entrepreneurial activity on the supply side. As policies traditionally associated with a mainstream left ideology are pictured as infeasible under international competition, rtm perceptions are likely to matter especially for citizens located on the left and centre-left as compared to those on the right. Again, conceptualizing the perceived meaningfulness of elections as an attitude mediating between beliefs about globalisation's constraining effect and electoral turnout, two testable implications follow:

H4: The effect of rtm perceptions on voter participation is stronger for citizens on the left side of the left-right scale.

H5: The effect of rtm perceptions on the perceived meaningfulness of elections is stronger for citizens on the left side of the left-right scale.

# 4. The Context: The 2001 British General Election, New Labour, and Economic Globalisation

This section gives a brief contextual overview on the UK General Election of 7 June 2001 and documents how economic globalisation played a significant role in the policies and rhetoric of New Labour. In what was termed an 'apathetic landslide' the Labour Party could defend its large parliamentary majority after the first term under Tony Blair (Norris 2001) while turnout fell to an all-time low of 59.38% and was 12 percentage points lower than in 1997 (International IDEA 2014).

As is well known (see Coates 2000; Heath et al. 2001), the Labour Party had undergone a drastic transformation after 1983 that particularly intensified under Blair who rose to leadership in 1994. Rebranding itself as 'New Labour', the party reformed its organizational structure and policy positions, particularly with regard to economic policies. While the Labour Party of 1983 stood for state ownership, centralized economic planning, extensive regulation of markets, taxation of the rich and extensive public spending, New Labour in 1997 took a decisively more positive stance towards markets: It committed itself to not increase income taxes; it promised to keep labour markets flexible; it advocated supply side policies in an effort to increase the competitiveness of the British economy; it promoted fiscal prudence and a tuff stance on inflation. Analyses of party positions show that Labour moved strongly rightwards occupying a position right from the centre for the first time in the post-war era in 1997 and 2001 (Bara and Budge 2001). Bara and Budge (2001: 602, 596) conclude that the three main parties had converged on a "neo-liberal" or Thatcherite consensus [...] on the economy' rendering party-positions 'closer to each other that at any time during the postwar period'.

A more detailed look at the New Labour manifestos illustrates how this 'Third Way' promarket shift was accompanied by a rhetoric that referred to an internationally connected economy and economic competitiveness. The 1997 Labour manifesto 'accept[ed] the global economy as a reality' and proclaimed 'a new partnership with business to improve the competitiveness of the British industry' (Labour Party 1997). The 2001 manifesto formulated the goals 'to raise our productivity faster than our competitors[,] to ensure our goods and services are competitive in world markets [and to] maintain the UK's position as the location of choice within Europe for international businesses' (Labour Party 2001). In a speech in 1996, Blair made the link between economic globalisation and New Labour's economic policies even more explicit: 'The key to New Labour economics is the recognition that Britain [...] [has] to compete in an increasingly international market place' (Tony Blair, cited in: Hay and Rosamond 2002: 152). Moreover, this 'image of global economic change to which the Party appealed tended to be accepted uncritically by the British media' (Watson and Hay 2003: 301).

As documented elsewhere in more detail (Hay and Rosamond 2002; Watson and Hay 2003; Wilkinson 2000), New Labour's centrist economic policy positions were thus motivated and

legitimized with reference to economic globalisation with 'New Labour perceiv[ing] globalisation as a series of processes which narrow the parameters within which government action can take place' (Wilkinson 2000: 136). While this is not the place to debate to which extent such rhetoric was merely strategic (see Burnham 2001; Watson and Hay 2003) or reflected sincere beliefs among New Labour's leadership, it is clear that New Labour communicated the notion that economic interconnectedness constrained the rtm of national governments offensively to citizens. In fact, Labour's move to the centre can itself be taken as a vivid example of a traditional left party abandoning long-held economic policy positions, because of structural changes stemming from the internationalization of markets and was likely understood as such by (some) citizens.<sup>3</sup> As citizens were, thus, exposed to the idea that competitive pressures significantly constrained their government's leeway, the question on which I focus below is whether citizen's individual perceptions of the government's influence on the economy in a globalised world in turn affected their inclination to vote.

### 5. Data and Analytical Strategy

The empirical analysis in this contribution utilizes data from the British Election Panel Study 1997-2001 (Heath et al. 2002). I mostly rely on the final post-election wave 8 though I occasionally draw on control variables only asked in earlier waves. All regression analyses employ weights intended to make the sample representative of individuals on the electoral register that also correct for an oversampling of individuals residing in Scotland, different selection probabilities resulting from household size and unit non-response at wave 1. 2,333 individuals were fully interviewed in wave 8 which amounts to circa 65% of the initial number of panel members.

Wave 8 of this panel study constitutes one of the very rare election surveys in which respondents were asked about their perception of the government's economic steering capacity in a globalised world. Specifically, respondents were asked: 'In today's worldwide economy, how much influence do you think British governments have on Britain's economy?' An advantage of this particular question is exactly that difficult concepts such as 'economic globalisation' that might be hard to grasp are avoided, while it is still clear that the question asks about the ability of governments to affect outcomes in the domestic economy given economic interconnectedness across countries. The four answer categories and their distribution are shown in the left-hand part of figure 2. While both extreme categories are picked relatively seldom, nearly half of the respondents believe the British national government to either have 'hardly any' or 'not very much' influence on Britain's economy. Clearly, a lot of British citizens were sceptical regarding their government's ability to influence were coded such that higher values mean more rtm and values were standardized to range from 0 to 1.

Turnout, the first dependent variable, was measured retrospectively by asking respondents whether they managed to vote: 77.26% report to have voted. This amounts to a difference of about 18 percentage points as compared to the official turnout and thus, as is common, to strong over-reporting which might arise from individuals giving wrong information and from sample selection effects. To measure the second dependent variable, the perceived meaningfulness of elections, I rely on the following question: 'And how much difference do you think it makes who wins in general elections to the (UK) House of Commons?' Answer categories and their distribution are shown in the right-hand side of figure 2. Logistic regressions are estimated where the dichotomous indicator of reported turnout is the dependent variable (H1, H3 and H4). Where the perceived meaningfulness of elections is the response

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> As this case can be interpreted as party platform convergence triggered by economic globalization, it illustrates the argument of the party position-path of figure 1 nicely. Moreover, this party position convergence was associated with a drop in turnout. While turnout was even dramatically lower in 2001, it had reached an at that time post-war low already in 1997 (International IDEA 2014).

variable (H2 and H5), ordered logit models are estimated due to the ordinal measurement scale of this instrument.

I include a set of established demographic and attitudinal predictors of turnout as control variables thereby drawing, on the whole, on a comparable set of covariates as previous research on voter participation in the 2001 British election (see Clarke et al. 2002; Whiteley et al. 2001). In terms of demographics, measures for age, gender and highest educational degree and income group are added. Indicators for the different elements of psychological political engagement, as spelled out by the CVM (Verba et al. 1995), i.e. political interest, political information, political efficacy and party identification, are also included alongside civic duty and perceived differences between the two main parties. Ordinal scales for these attitudinal predictors are entered as quasi-metric in the models below, are standardized to an interval from zero to one and are coded in such a direction that, theoretically, higher values should be associated with a higher likelihood of voting. Finally, one of the presented models for voter participation includes the intermediate outcome and second dependent variable, the perceived meaningfulness of elections, in order to test H3. As the theoretical model assumes that rtm perceptions affect turnout primarily *through* the perceived meaningfulness of elections, it is not expected that these variables remain necessarily statistically significant with the inclusion of this 'posttreatment' variable (see King and Zeng 2006: 147).





Note: Reported are unweighted data and only non-missing cases.

In order to test H4 and H5 about the moderating effect of ideology I draw on a 0-10 leftright self-placement scale. The question explicitly offered respondents the option to answer 'never think of myself in these terms' which was chosen by about 39%. In these cases, imputing a position seems problematic as respondents deliberately chose to answer that they do not think of themselves as having any position on the left-right scale. The cleanest and most sensible option is to limit the sample and therefore the inferences to those that reported a position for those models that test H4 and H5. With regard to all other variables, the analysis reported below is based on multiple imputation of missing values through chained equations (White et al. 2011) in order not to risk any bias or loss in efficiency from listwise deletion. In the appendix, I additionally report results from analogous models estimated through listwise deletion of observations containing missing values (table A.1). Generally, the estimates remain similar within narrow bounds, but are marginally less efficient with listwise deletion, as expected. The appendix also contains further details on the imputation model.

### 6. Results

Table 1 presents the results from regressions models for both voter turnout (columns 1-6) and perceptions on the meaningfulness of elections (columns 7 and 8). In a first step, I concentrate on the main hypothesis linking perceptions about the government's influence on the economy and electoral turnout (H1). The models are built in a stepwise fashion to transparently assess the robustness of the association among more simple and more complex model specifications. As perceived rtm is coded such that higher values mean a bigger influence of the British government, H1 expects a positive effect of this variable on turnout. Model 1, including only the demographic controls, shows that voter participation is more likely for those perceiving more rtm with the effect being strongly statistically significant. Model 2 introduces political interest, political knowledge and the party identification dummies from the CVM and shows that rtm perceptions, while reduced in size, still have a statistically significant positive effect on voter turnout. Are these results caused by the omission of suitable indicators for political efficacy? Model 3 enters measures for internal as well as external efficacy and shows that this seems not to be the case: The size of the coefficient on the rtm variable is only very marginally reduced in size and remains statistically significant with a p-value (slightly) below 0.05. Even when including a full battery of standard demographic and attitudinal predictors that should control exhaustively for citizen's general attitudes towards politics, rtm perceptions thus have an effect on turnout.

Model 4 presents an even tougher test by entering perceived differences between the two main parties which might themselves be affected to some extent by rtm perceptions as argued in note 2. Again, the effect of the rtm variable is only marginally reduced in size. The cumulative effect of introducing all these control variables is that the rtm variable is now statistically significant only according to the more generous p < 0.10 threshold, but overall the findings still indicate a robust *general* association between rtm perceptions and turnout.

If, moreover, H4 is correct in suggesting that effect of rtm perceptions varies over individual's positions on the left-right scale, modelling the effect as being constant might not be the best specification. Model 5 enters an interaction effect between left-right position coded into a dummy (0: left or centre; 1: right) and perceived rtm to the previous specification. The coefficient on the rtm variable now indicates the conditional effect for those who are ideologically left or in the centre. It is remarkable that this conditional effect is more than twice as big as the previously estimated constant effect and easily reaches standard significance levels. The interaction term itself ('Rtm X right') is negative and of substantial magnitude suggesting that the effect of rtm perception is reduced for those on the right in line with H4. It is, however, estimated very imprecisely and not statistically significant. Accordingly, the evidence in favour of H4 should be interpreted as being only suggestive for the time being.

Model 6 in table 1 adds the meaningfulness of elections to the specification of model 5. As expected, perceptions of the government's rtm is reduced in size and no longer significant. Not surprisingly, the meaningfulness of elections is clearly and strongly related to turnout vindicating H3. The more interesting question is whether attitudes on the relevance of election themselves are shaped by beliefs about the government's leeway under economic globalisation (H2 and H5).

This question is answered through the remaining models 7 and 8 where the dependent variable is now switched to views on the meaningfulness of elections and ordered logistic regressions models are reported. Model 7 is specified equivalently to model 4 and shows a substantial and statistically significant effect of rtm perceptions in accordance with H2. Perceiving less influence of the British government in a globalized economy is strongly associated with viewing elections as less meaningful, even when controlling for a long list of predictors related to individual's attitudes towards politics and electoral participation.

|   | Voter turnout   |              |              | Meaningful elections |                 |              |         |             |
|---|-----------------|--------------|--------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------------|---------|-------------|
|   | (1)             | (2)          | (3)          | (4)                  | (5)             | (6)          | (7)     | (8)         |
| Perceived   | $1.08^{***}$    | 0.65*        | 0.59*        | 0.54+                | $1.19^{*}$      | 0.41         | 0.89*** | 1.39***     |
| rtm   | (0.27)          | (0.30)       | (0.30)       | (0.30)               | (0.53)          | (0.31)       | (0.21)  | (0.32)      |
| Right   |                 |              |              |                      | 0.50            |              |         | $0.70^{*}$  |
|   |                 |              |              |                      | (0.49)          |              |         | (0.35)      |
| Rtm X right   |                 |              |              |                      | -0.81           |              |         | $-1.23^{*}$ |
|   |                 |              |              |                      | (0.87)          |              |         | (0.57)      |
| Duty to vote  |                 | 0.43*        | $0.41^{*}$   | 0.43*                | 0.29            | 0.42*        | 0.053   | 0.049       |
|   |                 | (0.17)       | (0.17)       | (0.17)               | (0.26)          | (0.17)       | (0.13)  | (0.18)      |
| Pol. interest   |                 | $1.80^{***}$ | 1.76***      | 1.66***              | 1.79***         | 1.30***      | 2.44*** | 2.79***     |
|   |                 | (0.35)       | (0.34)       | (0.35)               | (0.49)          | (0.35)       | (0.25)  | (0.32)      |
| Political   |                 | $0.62^{*}$   | $0.53^{+}$   | $0.52^{+}$           | 0.66            | $0.51^{+}$   | 0.15    | -0.056      |
| knowledge   |                 | (0.29)       | (0.29)       | (0.29)               | (0.45)          | (0.30)       | (0.21)  | (0.29)      |
| PI Cons.  |                 | 1.39***      | $1.38^{***}$ | 1.29***              | $1.33^{***}$    | 1.15***      | 0.85*** | 0.69*       |
|   |                 | (0.24)       | (0.24)       | (0.24)               | (0.32)          | (0.23)       | (0.21)  | (0.29)      |
| PI Labour   |                 | $1.38^{***}$ | 1.37***      | $1.18^{***}$         | 1.49***         | $1.00^{***}$ | 1.06*** | 0.92**      |
|   |                 | (0.22)       | (0.22)       | (0.23)               | (0.30)          | (0.23)       | (0.20)  | (0.29)      |
| PI Liberal  |                 | $1.70^{***}$ | 1.71***      | 1.61***              | 1.87***         | 1.56***      | 0.40+   | 0.35        |
| Democrats   |                 | (0.28)       | (0.28)       | (0.28)               | (0.40)          | (0.28)       | (0.22)  | (0.29)      |
| PI SNP  |                 | 1.32***      | 1.34***      | 1.29***              | 1.98***         | 1.17***      | 0.70*   | 0.77        |
|   |                 | (0.34)       | (0.34)       | (0.34)               | (0.56)          | (0.33)       | (0.34)  | (0.53)      |
| PI other  |                 | 1.01*        | 1.06*        | 1.02*                | 1.36*           | 1.03*        | 0.26    | 0.25        |
|   |                 | (0.41)       | (0.42)       | (0.41)               | (0.57)          | (0.43)       | (0.36)  | (0.47)      |
| Ext. efficacy   |                 |              | 0.12         | 0.015                | -0.70           | -0.083       | 0.67*   | 0.99**      |
|   |                 |              | (0.42)       | (0.43)               | (0.60)          | (0.43)       | (0.26)  | (0.34)      |
| Int. efficacy   |                 |              | 0.63         | 0.70+                | 0.81            | 0.70+        | 0.042   | -0.14       |
|   |                 |              | (0.40)       | (0.40)               | (0.57)          | (0.40)       | (0.25)  | (0.31)      |
| Party   |                 |              | (0110)       | 0.71***              | 0.50+           | 0.40+        | 1.91*** | 2.09***     |
| difference  |                 |              |              | (0.21)               | (0.28)          | (0.22)       | (0.15)  | (0.19)      |
| Meaningful  |                 |              |              | (0.21)               | (0.20)          | 1 49***      | (0.10)  | (0.1))      |
| elections   |                 |              |              |                      |                 | (0.29)       |         |             |
| Higher educ   | 0.84**          | 0.34         | 0.30         | 0.27                 | 0.35            | 0.20         | 0.10    | -0.044      |
| degree  | (0.26)          | (0.27)       | (0.27)       | (0.28)               | (0.35)          | (0.28)       | (0.18)  | (0.23)      |
| Higher  | 0.52*           | 0.28         | 0.27         | 0.26                 | 0.49            | 0.22         | 0.086   | 0.12        |
| education   | (0.23)          | (0.24)       | (0.24)       | (0.24)               | (0.35)          | (0.24)       | (0.16)  | (0.22)      |
| A-level   | 0.61**          | 0.32         | 0.28         | 0.28                 | 0.20            | 0.24         | 0.10    | 0.13        |
| 11 level  | (0.24)          | (0.25)       | (0.25)       | (0.25)               | (0.34)          | (0.25)       | (0.17)  | (0.25)      |
| O-level   | 0.30            | 0.14         | 0.14         | 0.12                 | 0.31            | 0.11         | 0.097   | 0.23        |
| 0 level   | (0.18)          | (0.19)       | (0.19)       | (0.12)               | (0.28)          | (0.19)       | (0.14)  | (0.20)      |
| Unner   | 0.83**          | 0.53+        | 0.47         | 0.50                 | 0.52            | 0.61+        | -0.31   | -0.23       |
| income  | (0.29)          | (0.31)       | (0.31)       | (0.31)               | (0.41)          | (0.31)       | (0.21)  | (0.20)      |
| Upper-  | 0.14            | -0.080       | -0.13        | -0.081               | 0.15            | -0.017       | -0.25   | -0.24       |
| middle inc  | (0.24)          | (0.27)       | (0.10)       | (0.27)               | (0.38)          | (0.27)       | (0.19)  | (0.26)      |
| Middle  | 0.33            | 0.22         | 0.21         | 0.23                 | 0.62+           | 0.35         | -0 47** | -0.55*      |
| income  | (0.23)          | (0.22)       | (0.21)       | (0.25)               | (0.35)          | (0.25)       | (0.18)  | (0.24)      |
| Lower-  | 0.24            | 0.23         | 0.23         | 0.23)                | 0.53            | 0.28         | -0.12   | -0.13       |
| middle inc  | (0.24)          | (0.23)       | (0.23)       | (0.21)               | (0.33)          | (0.20)       | (0.12)  | (0.24)      |
| Male  | 0.022           | -0.18        | -0.17        | (0.2+)               | -0.30+          | -0.12        | -0.090  | -0.11       |
| Widte   | (0.12)          | (0.14)       | (0.14)       | (0.15)               | (0.39)          | -0.12        | (0.090) | (0.13)      |
| ٨٥٥   | (0.13)          | (0.14)       | (0.14)       | 0.10***              | (0.20)<br>0.17* | 0.19**       | (0.096) | 0.14**      |
| Age   | 0.37<br>(0.0E0) | (0.057)      | (0.16)       | (0.19)               | (0.079)         | (0.10)       | (0.13)  | (0.051)     |
| $\Lambda a a^2$   | 0.0025***       | 0.0015*      | (0.037)      | (0.037)              | (0.078)         | 0.0016*      | (0.039) | 0.0015*     |
| лус   | -0.0033         | -0.0015      | -0.0010      | -0.001/              | -0.0014         | -0.0010      | -0.0013 | -0.0013     |
| N (mainter 1)   |                 | (0.0000)     |              |                      | (0.0008)        | (0.000)      | 0.0005) |             |
| in (weighted)   | 2,209           | 2,209        | 2,209        | 2,209                | 1,330           | 2,209        | 2,209   | 1,330       |
| (no weights)  | 2,330           | 2,330        | 2,330        | 2,330                | 1,403           | 2,329        | 2,329   | 1,402       |
| Pseudo-K <sup>2</sup> 0.093 0.18/ 0.193 0.206 0.198 0.22/ 0.28/ 0.310                                       |                 |              |              |                      |                 |              |         |             |
| employed; multiple imputation of missing values); standard errors in parentheses; constant and cut-offs not |                 |              |              |                      |                 |              |         |             |

Table 1: Binary and ordered logistic regressions

shown; Pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> is arithmetic mean of McKelvey/Zavoina R<sup>2</sup> on individual model estimations on imputed datasets; p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001.

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Importantly, the very clear evidence on H2 and H3 also help to corroborate the findings on H1 shown above: If rtm perceptions affect whether citizens think of election results as making a difference and these attitudes in turn affect voter turnout, than it must also hold that rtm perceptions affect turnout (via this channel). That the findings on the effect of rtm perceptions are somewhat stronger with this second dependent variable is also in line with the intuition from the theoretical model which assumes rtm perceptions to affect the perceived meaningfulness of the election directly and turnout only indirectly via this mechanism.

The final model 8 introduces an interaction term similar to the one contained in model 6 in order to test H5. Again, the coefficient for perceived rtm indicates the conditional effect for those in the centre or left to it. This effect is substantially larger than the unconditional estimate of model 7 and statistically highly significant. Moreover, for this dependent variable one obtains an interaction term that is not only negative and of substantial magnitude, but also statistically significant confirming H5: The effect of rtm perceptions is significantly smaller for those on the right (and larger for those on the left and centre). This clear evidence in support of H5 reinforces the suggestive evidence for H4 discussed above to some extent. In any event, it is reassuring that one finds a similar pattern for the interaction with both dependent variables.

To convey a better sense for the substantial meaning of the interaction effects and the substantial effects of the independent variables in general, figure 3 plots average marginal effects on the probability scale (see Mood 2009).<sup>4</sup> The left-hand side of figure 3 plots average marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of voting based on the estimation results from model 5. The right-hand side of figure 3 plots average marginal effects on the probability that an individual thinks of who wins in general elections to the House of Commons as making 'a great deal' of difference based on model 8. In the top, both plots show first two conditional marginal effects: The first row shows the effect of rtm perceptions for those on the left or in the centre, the second the effect for those on the right. The third row plots the overall average marginal effect of rtm perceptions. The rows below show the average marginal effects of the remaining covariates.



#### Figure 3: Average marginal effects on the probability scale

Note: Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> I use the user-written Stata program 'mimrgns' which computes marginal effects given multiple imputation by combining results from Stata's 'margin' command estimated on the individual datasets.

The figure reveals two key findings. First, the point estimates for the overall average marginal effects indicate substantially meaningful effect sizes of the rtm variable for both dependent variables. According to these, a one-unit change in perceived rtm, i.e. from 'hardly any' to 'a great deal' of influence, raises (a) the expected likelihood of (reported) voting by about 11 percentage points and (b) the likelihood of viewing elections as producing 'a great deal' of differences by about 15 percentage points. Second, behind these overall average marginal effects are pronounced differences in the conditional effects. For those on the right side of the left-right scale, the marginal effects are small (5 and 3 percentage points respectively) and statistically indistinguishable from zero. For those on the left or in the centre, the effects are clearly statistically significant and substantial indicating (a) a 15 percentage point increase in the probability of voting and (b) a 22 percentage point increase in the likelihood of viewing elections to the House of Commons as maximally meaningful. A formal test of differences in these conditional marginal effects shows again that only with regard to the second dependent variable, the meaningfulness of elections, we can have statistical confidence in the existence of a moderating effect of the left-right position: It rejects the null hypothesis of equal effects with p = 0.034.

As a final objection to discuss, consider that the specification of model 8 which gives rise to this finding is arguably a bit simplistic in that it collapses the left-right position into a dummy which involves setting a cut-off that is by necessity somewhat arbitrary. A more complex model would take advantage of the exact numerical value of the position on the left-right scale. In table A.2 in the appendix, I report estimation results for such a model for the perceived meaningfulness of elections which is otherwise similar to model 8. Formally, it specifies the interaction as follows:  $\beta_{i+1}(rtm) + \beta_{i+2}(position) + \beta_{i+3}(rtm * position) + \beta_{i+4}(position^2) + \beta_{i+5}(rtm * position) + \beta_{i+6}(position^2) + \beta_{i+6}(rtm * position^2) + \beta_{i+$ position<sup>2</sup>). It thereby allows the left-right position to have a non-linear effect on the meaningfulness of elections. It also allows the conditional effect of the rtm variable to vary in a non-linear way with the left-right position. Figure 4 displays how the conditional effects of rtm perception on the probability that individuals think of elections as making a great difference varies over the left-right position according to this model. It shows, in line with H5, that the effect is monotonically decreasing over the entire range of the left-right position with the confidence intervals being wider at both extremes where data is sparse. For those on the right, the estimated effect is close to zero. For those on the moderate left, we find substantially and statistically significant positive effects confirming the results from the simpler model 8.



Figure 4: Conditional effects of rtm perception based on model in table A.2 (appendix)

Notes: Point estimates with 95% confidence intervals.

### 7. Conclusion

This article has analysed whether individuals who believe that economic globalisation constrains the rtm of national governments are less inclined to vote in national elections. According to the underlying theoretical model, elections would be considered less important by citizens who believe their government to be constrained by the forces of economic globalisation. As citizens think of elections as carrying fewer implications for policy outcomes, they might, in turn, be less likely to vote. Moreover, as economic globalisation might be viewed to especially constrain economic policies that are traditionally associated with the mainstream left, the turnout-dampening effect of perceived globalisation constraints should be concentrated among citizens of the left and centre-left.

Drawing on the case of the 2001 British General Election, I obtain broad support for these theoretical conjectures. Most importantly, citizens that think of their government as having more influence on the economy under conditions of economic globalisation, are more likely to (report to) have voted. This association holds up under the inclusion of a wide range of established predictors of electoral turnout. Further findings also strongly support the proposed mechanism according to which rtm perceptions matter for the perceived importance of elections which in turn matter for turnout. Additionally, the findings tentatively support the hypothesis that perceived rtm constraints matter especially for citizens on the (moderate) left - although the findings are a bit weaker with regard to this moderating effect as they are significant only for the intermediate dependent variable, i.e. the perceived meaningfulness of elections. These findings reinforce each other and taken together they strongly support the theoretical model. Insofar, the present article adds micro-level support to the arguments advanced in Steiner (2010) and Marshall/Fisher (forthcoming) that economic globalisation has negative consequences for electoral turnout. There is, thus, cumulative evidence that economic globalisation and its consequences for the ability of national governments to exert control over policy outcomes might matter for electoral turnout with potentially worrisome implications.

As the data analysed are not experimental some principal caution in attaching causal meaning to the regression coefficient for rtm perceptions seems warranted; even though every effort was made to ensure robustness of the findings. Perhaps an obvious threat to causal inference is the possibility of reverse causality or related omitted variable bias: Could it be that citizens answer the question about the government's rtm in such a way that they rationalize a decision on whether to take part in the election that they actually made for others reasons potentially out of general political disaffection? For a number of reasons it is unlikely that the findings are driven by such reverse causality. As to the design of the questionnaire: While respondents were first asked about their voting participation, the rtm question was asked much later with more than 100 questions in between. It is, thus, unlikely that respondents still had their reported turnout decisions in mind and answered in an effort to justify their decision. Moreover, the statistical models control for a bunch of variables that are clearly more narrowly related to political disaffection and, thus, provide more obvious and cognitively less-demanding targets for rationalizing a turnout decision such as differences between the main parties, political interest, duty to vote or indicators of internal and external (i.e. whether parties are only interested in votes) efficacy. It is thus remarkable that rtm perceptions still have an effect after controlling for all these variables (some of which might even be argued to be themselves affected by rtm perceptions). In all likelihood, then, the findings do in fact reflect that perceptions about the government's influence in an economically interconnected world matter independently for voter participation.

While the present single country has thus been able to establish that perceptions of the government's rtm mattered for voter participation in the 2001 British General Election, it is an open question to be explored in future research how context-sensitive this finding is. As discussed, the context of the British election in 2001 was special in terms of the extent to which rtm constraints were openly discussed by political elites. While one might argue that elite discourses affect foremost the beliefs of citizens on the presence of constraints to the government's rtm themselves; but not the effects these beliefs, once present, have on voter

participation; an ultimate answer to the question whether and how the finding is replicable in other contexts has to await future studies. This, of course, requires the inclusion of relevant items in future surveys.

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# Appendix

This appendix contains additional material for the manuscript "Economic Globalisation, the Perceived Room to Manoeuvre of National Governments and Electoral Participation: Evidence from the 2001 British General Election". Section 1 contains additional details on the theoretical motivation, measurement and coding of control variables. Section 2 reports additional information on the multiple imputation procedure. Section 3 presents estimation results for the models reported in table 1 of the article using listwise deletion (table A.1) instead of multiple imputation. Section 4 presents findings for the model on which figure 4 in the article is based (table A.2).

### **1.** Detailed Information on Control Variables

In this section, I report details on the rationales behind and measurement of control variables included in the regression models. Turning first to the demographic controls: Age is centred at the sample mean and entered as a linear and a squared term to allow the effect of age to vary over the range of age as predicted by the "start-up/slow-down"-model (Verba and Nie 1972). Highest educational degree obtained and household income are considered in accordance with the standard socioeconomic status model of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972). For these two variables a set of dummy variables is introduced.<sup>5</sup> The reference categories form those with the lowest, i.e. no, educational degree and those with the lowest household income.

Political interest is measured on a five point-scale. Political information or knowledge is measured via the number of correct answers given to a set of six true or false knowledge questions. This quiz was run in wave 1 in 1997. Given the likely stability of political information, the 1997 measure of political knowledge is a reasonable proxy for political knowledge in 2001. I further consider two questions on different aspects of political efficacy asked, again, in wave 1 in 1997: Internal efficacy is measured by agreement to the statement "people like me have no say in what the government does" on a five point scale; one aspect of external efficacy is measured by a similar scale on the statement "parties are only interested in people's votes, not in their opinions".6 To facilitate interpretation, all of these variables are standardized such that zero is the minimum and one the maximum value and are coded in such a way that, theoretically, higher values should be associated with a higher likelihood of voting. Party identification is measured by a set of dummy variables that capture whether individuals identify with a particular party.7 Thereby, it is not only taken into account whether individuals identify with any party at all, the models also allow for the possibility that especially within the British FPTP electoral system the effect of party identification on turnout might depend on the size, and thus the viability, of the parties the individual identifies with (Karp and Banducci 2008).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Specifically, for income the original twenty categories of household before tax income are collapsed into five categories: lower, lower-middle, middle, upper-middle and upper income. For education, it is distinguished between no qualification, O-level and CSE, A-level, higher education below degree and higher education with degree. 28 cases coded "foreign or other" are coded as missing (and imputed for the multiple imputation estimates).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Note, that these are deliberately items that do not intend to measure the external efficacy *of elections* (as opposed to the indicator on beliefs about whether elections can result in meaningful differences) which are argued to be endogenous to room to manoeuvre-perceptions in the article. The rationale behind these indicators is to control for other aspects of political efficacy that should not be meaningfully affected by perceived room to manoeuvre.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Specifically, it is distinguished between those that identify with the Conservatives, with Labour, with the Liberal Democrats, with the Scottish National Party, or any other party. In the reference category are those that do not identify with any party.

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Civic duty and perceived differences between the two main parties are inserted as two further attitudinal predictors. As regards civic duty, respondents had to choose whether "people need not vote unless they really care who wins" (0) or whether it is "everyone's duty to vote" (1). Civic duty was, again, only included in wave 1, but should be a reasonably stable norm if the existing theoretical work is of any guidance. In line with the modified calculus of voting of Riker/Ordeshook (1968) civic duty can be thought of influencing the intrinsic motivation to vote. Perceived differences between Tories and Labour where captured with the following instrument: "Now, considering everything the Conservative and Labour Parties stand for, would you say that... there is a great difference between them, some difference, or, not much difference?" Theoretically, perceived differences between the modified calculus of voting. Note that this is a strong control, as it allows testing for an effect of perceived rtm holding perceived differences between the main contending parties constant and as perceived differences between parties and perceptions of the government's leeway might be causally related to each other, as argued in endnote 2 of the article.

### 2. Multiple Imputation

Note, first of all, that the amount of item non-response in the data analysed in the article is rather limited. In models not including the left-right variable at most (in model 6 in table A.1 below) 22.1 % percent of the initial 2,333 observations (unweighted) would be lost due to listwise deletion.<sup>8</sup> In order to impute missing values, I use multiple imputation through chained equations (MICE) as performed through Stata's "mi impute chained" command given the different, mostly non-metric measurement scales of variables of interest and the non-monotone missingness pattern. Stata's "mi impute chained" command allows specifying a targeted model for every variable to be imputed.

It was necessary to impute values for the following variables (though most missing values were concentrated on the income variables and internal and external efficacy): Household income, education, duty to vote, voter participation, external and internal efficacy, party differences, meaningful elections, political knowledge, room to manoeuvre perceptions and party identification. I also specified a version of the dummy variable for a position on the right side of the left-right scale as a variable to be imputed (setting also all those who answered "never think of myself in these terms" to missing as well) to improve the overall imputation model (even though I stuck with the original [i.e. not imputed] variable for the statistical analyses as explained in the article). I specified an ordered logit for household income, education, external and internal efficacy, party differences, meaningful elections, political knowledge, room to manoeuvre perceptions and party identification; a binary logit model for duty to vote, voter participation; and a multinomial logit model for party identification. The dummies for income, education and party identification were passively recoded from the respective variables after the imputation, as was the interaction term between the rtm variable and the left-right position.

All remaining variables used in the regression models in table 1, i.e. political interest (via a set of dummies), gender and age as well as age-squared, were also used as predictors in the imputation models for all variables to be imputed. Additionally, I included as predictors of income and education the following indicators: region (England vs. Scotland vs. Wales), marital

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Note that, as already mentioned in the article, all regression analyses employ weights intended to make the sample representative of individuals on the electoral register that also correct for an oversampling of individuals residing in Scotland, different selection probabilities resulting from household size and unit non-response at wave 1. As the mean of these weights is not by design one, nor necessarily one for the sample included in a particular estimation, the number of weighted and unweighted observations differ. For all regression models estimated, the number of weighted observations is slightly lower than the number of unweighted observations.

status (married, living as married, separated, divorced, widowed, single) interacted with gender, household size (in logged form), main economic activity during last week (e. g. being in education, in paid labour, unemployed or retired) and job status (employee [further discriminating between manager, foreman and none of the former two] vs. self-employed vs. never had a job). Reflecting the fact that I also draw on variables measured in earlier waves in 1997, I add (as continuous predictors) two indicators contained in the same wave (i.e. in 1997) that are related to these variables: Interest in politics and a question on whether respondents cared who won the election. These two indicators were however omitted in the imputation model for income and education.

The imputation model also made use of the weight ("wtergb", see article) contained in the dataset and the "augment" option to deal with problems of perfect prediction. I constructed 20 imputed datasets. In designing the imputation model I experimented with different imputation models and found that the results remained stable across different reasonable imputation models.

Note that a tiny fraction of missing values could not be imputed through the imputation procedure. This concerned observations that had missing values on a lot of the variables of interest at the same time. As a result, three (models 1-4 in table 1) to four (models 6 and 7) observations were still lost due to listwise deletion as apparent from the numbers of unweighted observations recorded in table 1 that are slightly below 2,333, the full number of completed interviews in wave 8.

#### **Results for Table 1 Using Listwise Deletion** 3.

| $\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $   |                       | (1)      | (2)      | (3)             | (4)          | (5)         | (6)          | (7)      | (8)         |
|--|-----------------------|----------|----------|-----------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|----------|-------------|
| $\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $   | Derceived             | 1 07***  | 0.70*    | 0.57+           | 0.54         | 1 20*       | 0.40         | 1 01***  | 1 59***     |
| Right         (0.30)         (0.30)         (0.30)         (0.30)         (0.30)         (0.30)         (0.30)         (0.30)         (0.30)         (0.40)           Rim X right         -1.35         -1.01         -1.35         -1.01           Duty to vote         0.37         0.36*         0.38'         0.078         0.36*         0.098         0.0014           Pol. interest         (0.39)         (0.40)         (0.27)         (0.18)         (0.14)         (0.23)           Political         0.668'         0.57*         0.56*         0.65         0.55*         0.099         -0.29           knowledge         0.630         (0.30)         (0.33)         (0.49)         (0.23)         (0.24)         (0.23)         (0.24)           Political         0.625         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.24)         (0.23)         (0.34)           Plabour         1.51***         1.55**         1.34***         1.46***         1.40***         1.32***         1.90***         1.90**         0.23         (0.34)         (0.32)           Democratis         0.030         (0.33)         (0.34)         (0.33)         (0.34)         (0.35)         (0.44)         (0.50)         (0.44)         (0.50) </td <td>rtm</td> <td>(0.28)</td> <td>(0.31)</td> <td>(0.33)</td> <td>(0.34)</td> <td>(0.57)</td> <td>(0.34)</td> <td>(0.24)</td> <td>(0.36)</td>  | rtm                   | (0.28)   | (0.31)   | (0.33)          | (0.34)       | (0.57)      | (0.34)       | (0.24)   | (0.36)      |
| Ingrin         0.02         0.02         0.02         0.02           Rm X right         (0.54)         (0.64)         (0.64)           Duty to vote         0.37'         0.36'         0.38'         0.078         0.36'         0.098           Duty to vote         0.37'         0.36'         0.38'         0.078         0.36'         0.099           Pol. intrest         1.83'''         1.81'''         1.69'''         1.74''         1.40'''         2.23''           Pol. intrest         0.68'         0.57'         0.56'         0.65         0.55'         0.029         0.23           Pol. intrest         0.630         0.033         0.033         0.049         0.33         0.24)         0.33'           PI Cons.         0.25'         0.26         0.26'         0.26'         0.26'         0.26'         0.23'         0.24'         0.33'           PI Cons.         0.23'         0.25'         0.26'         0.33'         0.24'         0.33'         0.34'         0.33'           PI Liberal         1.40'''         1.33'''         1.92'''         1.23'''         0.55'         0.55'         0.55'           PI tiberal         0.97''         0.52''         0.55'  | Right                 | (0.20)   | (0.31)   | (0.55)          | (0.34)       | 0.85        | (0.34)       | (0.24)   | 0.62        |
| Rim X right         -1.03         -1.01           Duty to vote         0.37'         0.36'         0.08'         0.078         0.36'         0.098         0.014           Duty to vote         0.37'         0.36'         0.08'         0.078         0.36'         0.098         0.014           Pol. interest         0.39'         0.40'         0.19'         0.27'         0.18'         0.16'         0.23''         2.63'''           Political         0.68'         0.55'         0.  | night                 |          |          |                 |              | (0.54)      |              |          | (0.02)      |
| Nin Arigin         1.33         1.34         1.35         1.31           Duty to vote         0.37'         0.36'         0.038'         0.078         0.36'         0.098         0.0014           Pol. interest         1.83"'         1.81"''         1.69'''         1.74"         1.40'''         2.23"''         2.63"''           Poli interest         0.639         0.040)         (0.41)         (0.56)         (0.42)         (0.23)           Political         0.68'         0.57'         0.56 +         0.65'         0.024)         (0.33)           Prilitical         0.630         (0.33)         (0.43)         (0.24)         (0.33)           Prilition         1.51"         1.55"''         1.34"''         1.14"''         1.16'''         0.88"'           Pl Labour         (0.25)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.44)         0.33         (0.44)         0.33           Pl Labour         (0.37)         (0.33)         (0.33)         (0.44)         0.65         (0.38)         (0.39)           Pl I blera         0.677         0.92"         0.85"         1.19"         0.80         4.5         0.48'           Democrats         0.37'         0.42'         0.65'   | Dtm V right           |          |          |                 |              | (0.34)      |              |          | (0.40)      |
|  | Kull A fight          |          |          |                 |              | -1.55       |              |          | -1.01       |
| Datily Byone         037         038         038         039         039         04014           Pol. interest         1.613"         1.61"         1.69"         1.74"         1.40"         2.23"         2.63"           Pol. interest         0.639         0.0401         0.055         0.055         0.039         0.239           knowledge         0.630         0.331         0.33         0.49         0.331         0.233           Plitical         0.68"         0.57"         0.56         0.65         0.626         0.239           knowledge         0.300         0.331         0.431         0.633         0.233         0.72'           Pl Cons.         1.51"         1.55"         1.55"         1.34"         1.66"         0.239         0.631           Pl labour         0.237         0.261         0.333         0.241         0.331         0.241         0.331           Pl labour         0.307         0.623         0.039         0.651         0.388         0.39           Pl babra         0.377         0.52'         0.55'         0.98         0.20         0.93"         1.23"           Democrats         0.037         0.59         0.075  | Destro to such a      |          | 0.07*    | 0.96+           | 0.00*        | (0.96)      | 0.06+        | 0.000    | (0.64)      |
| $ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$  | Duty to vote          |          | 0.37     | 0.36            | 0.38         | 0.078       | 0.36         | 0.098    | 0.0014      |
| Pol. interest         1.83         1.81         1.99         1.74         1.40         2.23         2.63           Political         0.63         0.401         0.655         0.655         0.657         0.029         (0.33)         (0.42)         (0.23)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.42)         (0.33)         (0.42)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.34)         (0.33)         (0.33)         (0.33)         (0.33)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.55)         (0.45)         (0.38)         (0.39)         (0.65)         (0.38)         (0.39)         (0.55)         (0.44)         (0.50)         (0.45)         (0.59)         (0.41)         (0.27)         (0.39)         (0.55)         (0.44)         (0.51)         (0.41)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.33)         (0.34)         (0.33)         (0.34)         (0.33)         (0.34)         (0.33) <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td>(0.18)</td><td>(0.19)</td><td>(0.19)</td><td>(0.27)</td><td>(0.18)</td><td>(0.14)</td><td>(0.20)</td></td<>  |                       |          | (0.18)   | (0.19)          | (0.19)       | (0.27)      | (0.18)       | (0.14)   | (0.20)      |
|  | Pol. interest         |          | 1.83     | 1.81            | 1.69         | 1.74        | 1.40         | 2.23     | 2.63        |
| Polnitical         0.68         0.57*         0.56*         0.655         0.099         -0.29           knowledge         (0.30)         (0.33)         (0.49)         (0.33)         (0.49)         (0.33)         (0.47)         (0.33)           PI Cons.         1.44"         1.41"         1.14"         1.16"         0.87"         0.72'           PI labour         (0.23)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.49)         (0.33)         (0.34)           PI labour         (0.23)         (0.25)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.55)         (0.38)         (0.39)         (0.55)         (0.59)         (0.45)         (0.48)         (0.59)           Pi other         (0.97'         0.92'         0.85'         1.19"         0.80         0.45'         0.48           Ext. efficacy         (0.77)         (0.50)         (0.51)         (0.51)         (0.51)         (0.52)         (0.31)           Int. efficacy         (0.41)         (0.62)         (0.59)         (0.41)         (0.26)         (0.33)           Party         (0.27)         0.62'         0.52  |                       |          | (0.39)   | (0.40)          | (0.41)       | (0.56)      | (0.42)       | (0.27)   | (0.35)      |
| knowledge         (0.30)         (0.33)         (0.43)         (0.43)         (0.43)         (0.43)         (0.23)         (0.23)         (0.23)         (0.23)         (0.24)         (0.23)         (0.25)         (0.25)         (0.26)         (0.36)         (0.26)         (0.23)         (0.23)         (0.23)         (0.23)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.26)         (0.38)         (0.39)         (0.55)         (0.44)         (0.50)         (0.44)         (0.51)         (0.45)         (0.59)         (0.44)         (0.51)         (0.44)         (0.51)         (0.44)         (0.51)         (0.44)         (0.51)         (0.44)         (0.51)         (0.41)         (0.26)         (0.31)         (0.33)         (0.31)         (0.31)         (0.31)         (0.31)         (0.31)         (0.31)         (0.31)         (0.31)         (0.31)         (0.31)         (0.31)         (0.31)         (0.3  | Political             |          | 0.68*    | 0.57+           | 0.56+        | 0.65        | 0.55+        | 0.099    | -0.29       |
| PI Cons,       1.44 <sup>47</sup> 1.41 <sup>47</sup> 1.29 <sup>77</sup> 1.14 <sup>47</sup> 1.16 <sup>177</sup> 0.27 <sup>7</sup> PI Labour       1.51 <sup>177</sup> 1.55 <sup>77</sup> 1.34 <sup>177</sup> 1.69 <sup>177</sup> 0.263       (0.26)         PI Liberal       (0.23)       (0.25)       (0.26)       (0.33)       (0.26)       (0.23)       (0.24)         Democrats       (0.30)       (0.33)       (0.33)       (0.44)       (0.33)       (0.33)       (0.44)       (0.33)       (0.34)         PI SNP       1.40 <sup>177</sup> 1.33 <sup>277</sup> 1.92 <sup>17</sup> 1.25 <sup>57</sup> 0.52       0.668         (0.37)       (0.38)       (0.33)       (0.65)       (0.38)       (0.39)       (0.55)         Ext. efficacy       0.97 <sup>7</sup> 0.92 <sup>1</sup> 0.85 <sup>5</sup> 1.19 <sup>17</sup> 0.80       0.45       0.659         Ext. efficacy       0.047       (0.44)       (0.41)       (0.61)       (0.41)       (0.27)       (0.36)         Int. efficacy       0.62       0.62       0.63       (0.30)       0.20       0.20       0.33         Int. efficacy       0.62 <sup>7</sup> 0.62       0.51       0.55       0.43 <sup>4</sup> 1.90 <sup>17</sup> 0.22         Int. efficacy       0.271       0.29 </td <td>knowledge</td> <td></td> <td>(0.30)</td> <td>(0.33)</td> <td>(0.33)</td> <td>(0.49)</td> <td>(0.33)</td> <td>(0.24)</td> <td>(0.33)</td>   | knowledge             |          | (0.30)   | (0.33)          | (0.33)       | (0.49)      | (0.33)       | (0.24)   | (0.33)      |
| $ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$  | PI Cons.              |          | 1.44***  | 1.41***         | 1.29***      | 1.14**      | $1.16^{***}$ | 0.87***  | $0.72^{*}$  |
| Pl Labour       1.51"**       1.55"**       1.34"**       1.69"**       1.20"**       0.99"**       0.88"*         PI Liberal       1.79"**       1.89"**       1.79"**       1.90"**       1.74"**       0.38       0.28         Democrats       (0.30)       (0.33)       (0.33)       (0.44)       (0.33)       (0.24)       (0.32)         PI SNP       1.40"**       1.33"**       1.32"**       1.92"*       1.25"*       0.52       0.68         PI other       (0.37)       (0.38)       (0.39)       (0.65)       (0.38)       (0.39)       (0.55)         Ext. efficacy       (0.44)       (0.50)       (0.44)       (0.27)       (0.36)       (0.45)       (0.59)         Ext. efficacy       0.62       0.69       1.00"       0.71"       -0.073       -0.19         Party       (0.41)       (0.42)       (0.59)       (0.41)       (0.20)       (0.23)         Meaningful       1.9"       .062'       0.52"       0.51       0.55'       0.43'       1.90"*       .13"*         elections  |                       |          | (0.25)   | (0.26)          | (0.26)       | (0.36)      | (0.26)       | (0.23)   | (0.34)      |
| 0.23)         (0.25)         (0.26)         (0.33)         (0.23)         (0.23)         (0.31)           Democrats         (0.30)         (0.33)         (0.44)         (0.33)         (0.24)         (0.32)           PI SNP         1.40"         1.33"         1.32"         1.92"         1.25"         0.52         0.68           PI other         0.97'         0.92"         0.85"         1.19"         0.80         0.45         0.48           Ext. efficacy         0.075         0.075         -0.075         -0.08         -0.20         0.93"         1.23"*           Ext. efficacy         0.075         -0.075         -0.08         -0.20         0.93"         1.23"*           Int. efficacy         0.071         (0.61)         (0.44)         (0.21)         (0.26)         (0.33)           Party         0.621         0.629         1.00"         0.71"         -0.073         -0.19           difference         (0.31)         (0.42)         (0.59)         (0.31)         (0.24)         (0.41)         -0.16           diggerenduc.         1.13"*         0.62'         0.51         0.55         0.45         0.041         -0.16           degree         0.62'  | PI Labour             |          | 1.51***  | 1.55***         | 1.34***      | 1.69***     | $1.20^{***}$ | 0.99***  | $0.88^{**}$ |
| PI Liberal         1,79"**         1,89"**         1,79"**         1,90"**         1,74"**         0.38         0.28           Democrats         (0.30)         (0.33)         (0.43)         (0.43)         (0.43)         (0.42)         (0.32)           PI SNP         1,40"*         1,33"**         1,32"**         1,92"*         1,25"*         0.52         0.68           PI other         (0.47)         0,92"         0.85*         1,19"         0.60         0.45         0.48           PI other         (0.44)         (0.50)         0.075         -0.98         -0.20         0.93"**         1,23"**           Ext. efficacy         0.62         0.69         1.00"         0.71"         -0.073         -0.19           Party         0.62'         0.69         1.00"         0.14"         (0.26)         (0.33)           difference         0.71"         0.62'         0.43"         1.90"*         2.18"**           elections         1.3"**         0.62'         0.52"         0.51         0.55         0.45         0.041         -0.16           difference         0.27'         0.29'         0.31'         0.38'         0.31         0.38         0.31         0.28' <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td>(0.23)</td><td>(0.25)</td><td>(0.26)</td><td>(0.33)</td><td>(0.26)</td><td>(0.23)</td><td>(0.31)</td></t<>   |                       |          | (0.23)   | (0.25)          | (0.26)       | (0.33)      | (0.26)       | (0.23)   | (0.31)      |
| $ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $  | PI Liberal            |          | 1.79***  | 1.89***         | 1.79***      | 1.90***     | 1.74***      | 0.38     | 0.28        |
| PI SNP         1.40 <sup>***</sup> 1.33 <sup>***</sup> 1.32 <sup>***</sup> 1.92 <sup>**</sup> 1.92 <sup>**</sup> 0.53 <sup>**</sup> 0.63 <sup>**</sup> 0.03 <sup>**</sup> 0.01 <sup>**</sup> 0.02 <sup>**</sup> 0.01 <sup>**</sup> 0.02 <sup>**</sup> 0.01 <sup>**</sup> 0.02 <sup>**</sup> 0.01 <sup>**</sup> 0.03 <sup>**</sup> 0.01 <sup>**</sup> 0.03 <sup>**</sup> 0.01 <sup>**</sup> 0.03 <sup>**</sup> | Democrats             |          | (0.30)   | (0.33)          | (0.33)       | (0.44)      | (0.33)       | (0.24)   | (0.32)      |
| PI other $(0.37)$ $(0.38)$ $(0.39)$ $(0.65)$ $(0.38)$ $(0.38)$ $(0.38)$ $(0.38)$ $(0.38)$ $(0.38)$ $(0.48)$ $(0.44)$ Ext. efficacy $(0.44)$ $(0.50)$ $(0.49)$ $(0.71)$ $(0.50)$ $(0.45)$ $(0.59)$ Ext. efficacy $(0.44)$ $(0.61)$ $(0.61)$ $(0.44)$ $(0.50)$ $(0.71)^{*}$ $(0.73)^{*}$ Int. efficacy $(0.41)$ $(0.42)$ $(0.59)$ $(0.41)$ $(0.26)$ $(0.33)$ Party $(0.41)$ $(0.42)$ $(0.59)$ $(0.41)$ $(0.26)$ $(0.33)$ Meaningful $(0.57)^{*}$ $(0.53)^{*}$ $(0.53)^{*}$ $(0.51)^{*}$ $(0.27)^{*}$ $(0.22)^{*}$ Meaningful $(0.27)^{*}$ $(0.27)^{*}$ $(0.23)^{*}$ $(0.30)^{*}$ $(0.24)^{*}$ $(0.21)^{*}$ $(0.22)^{*}$ Meaningful $(0.27)^{*}$ $(0.29)^{*}$ $(0.30)^{*}$ $(0.31)^{*}$ $(0.33)^{*}$ $(0.24)^{*}$ $(0.20)^{*}$ $(0.26)^{*}$ Higher educ. $1.13^{**}$ $0.62^{*}$ $0.52^{*}$ $0.51^{*}$ $0.55^{*}$ $0.45^{*}$ $0.041^{*}$ $(0.26)^{*}$ elections $(0.24)^{*}$ $(0.22)^{*}$ $(0.33)^{*}$ $(0.33)^{*}$ $(0.31)^{*}$ $(0.22)^{*}$ $(0.26)^{*}$ Higher educ. $(0.63^{*})$ $0.62^{*}$ $0.21^{*}$ $(0.23)^{*}$ $(0.23)^{*}$ $(0.24)^{*}$ $(0.20)^{*}$ Alevel $(0.68^{*})$ $0.38$ $0.34$ $0.37$ $0.34$ $0.36$ $-0.11$ $-0.20$ $(0.20)^{*}$ $($   | PI SNP                |          | 1.40***  | $1.33^{***}$    | $1.32^{***}$ | $1.92^{**}$ | 1.25**       | 0.52     | 0.68        |
| PI other         0,97'         0,92'         0,85'         1,19'         0,80         0,45         0,48           Ext. efficacy         0,075         0,075         0,075         0,08         0,20         0,93'''         1,23'''           Int. efficacy         0,041         (0,44)         (0,61)         (0,44)         (0,62)         0,03''         0,19''           Int. efficacy         0,62         0,69         1,00''         0,41'         (0,26)         0,33''           Party         0,61         (0,42)         (0,59)         (0,41)         (0,26)         (0,33)           Meaningful         1.13'''         0,62'         0,52'         0,51         0,55         0,45         0,041         -0,16'           degree         0,27'         0,29'         0,30''         0,31         0,02         0,22'           Higher educ.         1,13'''         0,62'         0,42         0,49''         0,48''         0,77'         0,48''         0,01''         0,02           degree         0,68''         0,33         0,21         0,20'''         0,23''''         0,24''''         0,24''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''  |                       |          | (0.37)   | (0.38)          | (0.39)       | (0.65)      | (0.38)       | (0.39)   | (0.56)      |
| $ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $  | PI other              |          | 0.97*    | $0.92^{+}$      | 0.85+        | $1.19^{+}$  | 0.80         | 0.45     | 0.48        |
| $ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $  |                       |          | (0.44)   | (0.50)          | (0.49)       | (0.71)      | (0.50)       | (0.45)   | (0.59)      |
| $ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$  | Ext. efficacy         |          |          | 0.075           | -0.075       | -0.98       | -0.20        | 0.93***  | 1.23***     |
| $ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $  | 2                     |          |          | (0.44)          | (0.44)       | (0.61)      | (0.44)       | (0.27)   | (0.36)      |
| $ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $  | Int. efficacy         |          |          | 0.62            | 0.69         | 1.00+       | 0.71+        | -0.073   | -0.19       |
| Party $0.71^{+}$ $0.63^{+}$ $0.43^{+}$ $1.90^{++}$ $2.18^{++}$ difference(0.23)(0.30)(0.24)(0.17)(0.22)Meaningful $1.39^{++}$ $1.39^{++}$ (0.27)(0.29)(0.30)(0.31)(0.33)Higher educ. $1.13^{++}$ $0.62^{+}$ $0.52^{+}$ $0.51$ $0.55$ $0.45$ $0.041$ $-0.16$ degree(0.27)(0.29)(0.30)(0.31)(0.33)(0.20)(0.26)Higher $0.62^{+}$ $0.42$ $0.49^{+}$ $0.48^{+}$ $0.77^{+}$ $0.48^{+}$ $-0.032$ $0.026$ education(0.24)(0.25)(0.26)(0.27)(0.39)(0.27)(0.17)(0.24)A-level $0.68^{++}$ $0.38$ $0.34$ $0.37$ $0.34$ $0.36$ $-0.11$ $-0.20$ (0.25)(0.26)(0.28)(0.22)(0.31)(0.22)(0.16)(0.22)O-level $0.38^{+}$ $0.37$ $0.22$ $0.22$ (0.31)(0.23)(0.20)(0.28)O-level $0.38^{+}$ $0.23$ $0.21$ $0.20$ $0.33$ (0.41)(0.33)(0.23)(0.30)Upper $0.12$ $0.28$ (0.20)(0.23)(0.30)(0.40)(0.30)(0.21)(0.29)Middle inc.(0.24)(0.28)(0.30)(0.30)(0.44)(0.33)(0.23)(0.26)Income(0.23)(0.27)(0.28)(0.27)(0.27)(0.34)(0.27)(0.21) <td><b>)</b></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>(0.41)</td> <td>(0.42)</td> <td>(0.59)</td> <td>(0.41)</td> <td>(0.26)</td> <td>(0.33)</td>   | <b>)</b>              |          |          | (0.41)          | (0.42)       | (0.59)      | (0.41)       | (0.26)   | (0.33)      |
| $\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $   | Party                 |          |          | ()              | 0.71**       | 0.63*       | 0.43+        | 1.90***  | 2.18***     |
| $\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $   | difference            |          |          |                 | (0.23)       | (0.30)      | (0.24)       | (0.17)   | (0.22)      |
| Interminent         (0.33)           Higher educ.         1.13 <sup>***</sup> 0.62 <sup>*</sup> 0.51         0.55         0.45         -0.16           degree         (0.27)         (0.29)         (0.31)         (0.20)         (0.26)           Higher         0.62 <sup>*</sup> 0.42         (0.49 <sup>+</sup> 0.48 <sup>+</sup> -0.77 <sup>*</sup> 0.48 <sup>+</sup> -0.032         0.026           education         (0.24)         (0.25)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.29)         (0.21)         (0.29)         (0.21)         (0.22)         (0.33)         (0.23)         (0.21)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.24)         (0.28)         (0.21)          (0.22)   | Meaningful            |          |          |                 | (00-0)       | (0000)      | 1.39***      | ()       | (0)         |
| Higher educ. $1.3^{***}$ $0.62^*$ $0.52^+$ $0.51$ $0.55$ $0.45^*$ $0.041$ $-0.16$ degree $(0.27)$ $(0.29)$ $(0.30)$ $(0.31)$ $(0.38)$ $(0.31)$ $(0.20)$ $(0.26)$ Higher $0.62^*$ $0.42$ $0.49^+$ $0.48^+$ $0.77^*$ $0.48^+$ $-0.032$ $0.026$ education $(0.24)$ $(0.25)$ $(0.26)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.39)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.17)$ $(0.24)$ A-level $0.68^{**}$ $0.38$ $0.34$ $0.37$ $0.34$ $0.36$ $-0.11$ $-0.20$ $(0.25)$ $(0.26)$ $(0.28)$ $(0.28)$ $(0.38)$ $(0.28)$ $(0.20)$ $(0.28)$ O-level $0.38^+$ $0.23$ $0.21$ $0.20$ $0.36$ $0.21$ $-0.077$ $0.0028$ $(0.20)$ $(0.21)$ $(0.22)$ $(0.22)$ $(0.31)$ $(0.22)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.22)$ Upper $0.60^\circ$ $0.37$ $0.22$ $0.25$ $0.34$ $0.36$ $-0.30$ $-0.40$ income $(0.29)$ $(0.32)$ $(0.33)$ $(0.41)$ $(0.33)$ $(0.23)$ $(0.30)$ Upper $-0.12$ $-0.28$ $-0.25$ $-0.19$ $-0.039$ $-0.11$ $-0.27$ $-0.45$ middle inc. $(0.24)$ $(0.28)$ $(0.30)$ $(0.40)$ $(0.30)$ $(0.21)$ $(0.26)$ Lower- $0.091$ $0.069$ $0.088$ $0.076$ $0.49$ $0.16$ $-0.24$ $-0.38$ middle inc. $(0.23)$ $(0.27)$ <td< td=""><td>elections</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>(0.33)</td><td></td><td></td></td<>   | elections             |          |          |                 |              |             | (0.33)       |          |             |
| Instruction         Instruction <thinstruction< th=""> <thinstruction< th=""></thinstruction<></thinstruction<>  | Higher educ.          | 1.13***  | 0.62*    | $0.52^{+}$      | 0.51         | 0.55        | 0.45         | 0.041    | -0.16       |
| degree(0.17)(0.19)(0.11)(0.24)A-level0.68**0.380.340.370.340.36-0.11-0.20(0.28)O-level0.38*0.230.210.20(0.31)(0.22)(0.22)(0.11)(0.22)(0.22)Upper0.60*0.370.220.250.340.36-0.30-0.40income(0.29)(0.32)(0.33)(0.33)(0.41)(0.33)(0.23)(0.30)Upper0.12-0.28-0.25-0.19-0.039-0.11-0.27-0.45middle inc.(0.24)(0.28)(0.30)(0.30)(0.40)(0.30)(0.21)(0.29)Middle0.100.0770.140.180.67+0.30-0.55*-0.78*income(0.23)(0.25)(0.27)(0.27)(0.34)(0.27)(0.21)(0.26)Lower-0.0910.0690.0880.0760.490.16-0.24-0.38middle inc.(0.23)(0.25)(0.27)(0.27)(0.34)(0.27)(0.21)(0.26)Male-0.012-0.22-0.24-0   | degree                | (0.27)   | (0.29)   | (0.30)          | (0.31)       | (0.38)      | (0.31)       | (0, 20)  | (0.26)      |
| Ingred         0.02         0.12         0.17         0.10         0.07         0.17         0.102         0.102           education         (0.24)         (0.25)         (0.26)         (0.27)         (0.39)         (0.27)         (0.17)         (0.24)           A-level         0.668**         0.38         0.34         0.37         0.34         0.36         -0.11         -0.20           (0.25)         (0.26)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.38)         (0.28)         (0.20)         (0.28)           O-level         0.38 +         0.23         0.21         0.20         0.36         0.21         -0.077         0.0028           (0.20)         (0.21)         (0.22)         (0.22)         (0.31)         (0.22)         (0.30)         0.30           Upper         0.60*         0.37         0.22         0.25         0.34         0.36         -0.30         -0.40           income         (0.29)         (0.32)         (0.33)         (0.41)         (0.33)         (0.21)         (0.29)           Middle         0.10         0.077         0.14         0.18         0.67*         0.30         -0.55*         -0.78**           income         (0.23)   | Higher                | $0.62^*$ | (0.29)   | 0.49+           | 0.48+        | 0.77*       | 0.48+        | -0.032   | 0.026       |
| A-level         0.68*         0.38         0.34         0.37         0.34         0.36         -0.11         -0.20           O-level         0.38*         0.23         0.21         0.20         0.36         0.21         -0.077         0.0028           O-level         0.38*         0.37         0.22         (0.31)         (0.22)         (0.16)         (0.22)           Upper         0.60*         0.37         0.22         (0.21)         (0.22)         (0.31)         (0.22)         (0.16)         (0.22)           Upper         0.60*         0.37         0.22         0.25         0.34         0.36         -0.30         -0.40           income         (0.29)         (0.32)         (0.33)         (0.33)         (0.41)         (0.33)         (0.23)         (0.29)           Middle inc.         (0.24)         (0.28)         (0.30)         (0.40)         (0.30)         (0.21)         (0.29)           Middle inc.         (0.23)         (0.27)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.29)         (0.26)           Lower-         0.091         0.069         0.088         0.076         0.49         0.16         -0.24   | education             | (0.24)   | (0.12)   | (0.15)          | (0.27)       | (0.39)      | (0.27)       | (0.17)   | (0.24)      |
| Mixed       0.00  | A-level               | 0.68**   | 0.38     | 0.34            | 0.37         | 0.34        | 0.36         | -0.11    | -0.20       |
| O-level         0.38 <sup>+</sup> 0.23         0.21         0.20         0.36         0.21         -0.077         0.0028           (0.20)         (0.21)         (0.22)         (0.22)         (0.31)         (0.22)         (0.16)         (0.22)           Upper         0.60°         0.37         0.22         0.25         0.34         0.36         -0.30         -0.40           income         (0.29)         (0.32)         (0.33)         (0.33)         (0.41)         (0.33)         (0.23)         (0.30)           Upper         -0.12         -0.28         -0.25         -0.19         -0.039         -0.11         -0.27         -0.45           middle inc.         (0.24)         (0.28)         (0.30)         (0.30)         (0.40)         (0.30)         (0.21)         (0.29)           Middle         0.10         0.077         0.14         0.18         0.67 <sup>+</sup> 0.30         -0.55 <sup>**</sup> -0.78 <sup>**</sup> income         (0.23)         (0.27)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.36)         (0.28)         (0.20)         (0.21)         (0.26)           Lower-         0.091         0.069         0.088         0.076         0.49         0.16         -0.24  | <i>H</i> -iever       | (0.25)   | (0.26)   | (0.23)          | (0.28)       | (0.38)      | (0.28)       | (0.20)   | (0.28)      |
| Order         0.20         0.21         0.22         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.007         0.007         0.22         0.31         0.22         0.23         0.21         0.21         0.21         0.22         0.21         0.21         0.01         0.021         0.021         0.22           upper         0.60*         0.37         0.22         0.25         0.34         0.36         -0.30         -0.40           income         (0.29)         (0.32)         (0.33)         (0.30)         (0.40)         (0.30)         (0.21)         (0.29)           Middle         0.10         0.077         0.14         0.18         0.67+         0.30         -0.55*         -0.78*           income         (0.23)         (0.27)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.36)         (0.28)         (0.20)         (0.26)           Lower-         0.091         0.069         0.088         0.076         0.49         0.16         -0.24         -0.38           middle inc.  | O-level               | 0.38+    | 0.23     | 0.20)           | 0.20         | 0.36        | 0.20)        | (0.20)   | 0.0028      |
| Upper         0.60°         0.37         0.22         0.25         0.34         0.36         -0.30         -0.40           income         (0.29)         (0.32)         (0.33)         (0.33)         (0.41)         (0.33)         (0.23)         (0.30)           Upper-         -0.12         -0.28         -0.25         -0.19         -0.039         -0.11         -0.27         -0.45           middle inc.         (0.24)         (0.28)         (0.30)         (0.40)         (0.30)         (0.21)         (0.29)           Middle         0.10         0.077         0.14         0.18         0.67+         0.30         -0.55**         -0.78**           income         (0.23)         (0.27)         (0.28)         (0.23)         (0.27)         (0.28)         (0.34)         (0.27)         (0.24)         -0.38           middle inc.         (0.23)         (0.25)         (0.27)         (0.27)         (0.34)         (0.27)         (0.21)         (0.26)           Male         -0.012         -0.22         -0.29+         -0.24         -0.53*         -0.24         -0.085         -0.055           (0.14)         (0.15)         (0.16)         (0.16)         (0.22)         (0.16)  | Olever                | (0.30)   | (0.23)   | (0.21)          | (0.20)       | (0.31)      | (0.21)       | (0.16)   | (0.22)      |
| Opper         0.00         0.37         0.22         0.23         0.34         0.36         40.30         40.40           income         (0.29)         (0.32)         (0.33)         (0.33)         (0.41)         (0.33)         (0.23)         (0.30)           Upper-         -0.12         -0.28         -0.25         -0.19         -0.039         -0.11         -0.27         -0.45           middle inc.         (0.24)         (0.28)         (0.30)         (0.40)         (0.30)         -0.55**         -0.78**           income         (0.23)         (0.27)         (0.28)         (0.28)         (0.36)         (0.28)         (0.20)         (0.26)           Lower-         0.091         0.069         0.088         0.076         0.49         0.16         -0.24         -0.38           middle inc.         (0.23)         (0.25)         (0.27)         (0.34)         (0.27)         (0.21)         (0.26)           Male         -0.012         -0.22         -0.29*         -0.24         -0.53*         -0.24         -0.085         -0.055           (0.14)         (0.15)         (0.16)         (0.16)         (0.12)         (0.16)         (0.14)           Age         0.36***<   | Upper                 | 0.20)    | 0.27     | 0.22)           | 0.22)        | 0.34        | 0.22)        | 0.10)    | 0.40        |
| Income       (0.29)       (0.32)       (0.33)       (0.33)       (0.41)       (0.33)       (0.23)       (0.30)         Upper-       -0.12       -0.28       -0.25       -0.19       -0.039       -0.11       -0.27       -0.45         middle inc.       (0.24)       (0.28)       (0.30)       (0.30)       (0.40)       (0.30)       (0.21)       (0.29)         Middle       0.10       0.077       0.14       0.18       0.67+       0.30       -0.55**       -0.78**         income       (0.23)       (0.27)       (0.28)       (0.28)       (0.36)       (0.28)       (0.20)       (0.26)         Lower-       0.091       0.069       0.088       0.076       0.49       0.16       -0.24       -0.38         middle inc.       (0.23)       (0.25)       (0.27)       (0.27)       (0.34)       (0.27)       (0.21)       (0.26)         Male       -0.012       -0.22       -0.29*       -0.24       -0.53*       -0.24       -0.085       -0.055         (0.14)       (0.15)       (0.16)       (0.16)       (0.22)       (0.16)       (0.11)       (0.14)         Age       -0.36***       0.17**       0.18**       0.19**  | income                | (0.20)   | (0.37)   | (0.33)          | (0.23)       | (0.41)      | (0.33)       | (0.23)   | -0.40       |
| byper       -0.12       -0.23       -0.23       -0.19       -0.039       -0.11       -0.27       -0.43         middle inc.       (0.24)       (0.28)       (0.30)       (0.30)       (0.40)       (0.30)       (0.21)       (0.29)         Middle       0.10       0.077       0.14       0.18       0.67+       0.30       -0.55**       -0.78**         income       (0.23)       (0.27)       (0.28)       (0.28)       (0.36)       (0.28)       (0.20)       (0.26)         Lower-       0.091       0.069       0.088       0.076       0.49       0.16       -0.24       -0.38         middle inc.       (0.23)       (0.25)       (0.27)       (0.27)       (0.34)       (0.27)       (0.21)       (0.26)         Male       -0.012       -0.22       -0.29+       -0.24       -0.53*       -0.24       -0.085       -0.055         (0.14)       (0.15)       (0.16)       (0.16)       (0.22)       (0.16)       (0.11)       (0.14)         Age       0.36***       0.17**       0.18**       0.19**       0.16+       0.18**       0.12**       0.12*         (0.055)       (0.061)       (0.007)       (0.007)       (0.009)   | Upper                 | 0.29)    | 0.22     | 0.25            | 0.10         | 0.030       | 0.11         | 0.23     | 0.45        |
| Middle inc.       (0.24)       (0.26)       (0.30)       (0.40)       (0.40)       (0.30)       (0.21)       (0.29)         Middle       0.10       0.077       0.14       0.18       0.67+       0.30       -0.55**       -0.78**         income       (0.23)       (0.27)       (0.28)       (0.28)       (0.28)       (0.28)       (0.20)       (0.26)         Lower-       0.091       0.069       0.088       0.076       0.49       0.16       -0.24       -0.38         middle inc.       (0.23)       (0.25)       (0.27)       (0.27)       (0.34)       (0.27)       (0.21)       (0.26)         Male       -0.012       -0.22       -0.29+       -0.24       -0.53*       -0.24       -0.085       -0.055         (0.14)       (0.15)       (0.16)       (0.16)       (0.22)       (0.16)       (0.11)       (0.14)         Age       0.36***       0.17**       0.18**       0.16+       0.18**       0.12**       0.12*         (0.055)       (0.061)       (0.064)       (0.065)       (0.083)       (0.066)       (0.045)       (0.006)         Age <sup>2</sup> -0.0036***       -0.0016*       -0.0017*       -0.0018**       -0.0016*  | opper-                | -0.12    | -0.28    | -0.23           | -0.19        | -0.039      | -0.11        | -0.27    | -0.43       |
| Middle0.100.0770.140.180.070.30-0.35-0.78income(0.23)(0.27)(0.28)(0.28)(0.36)(0.28)(0.20)(0.26)Lower-0.0910.0690.0880.0760.490.16-0.24-0.38middle inc.(0.23)(0.25)(0.27)(0.27)(0.34)(0.27)(0.21)(0.26)Male-0.012-0.22-0.29+-0.24-0.53*-0.24-0.085-0.055(0.14)(0.15)(0.16)(0.16)(0.22)(0.16)(0.11)(0.14)Age0.36***0.17**0.18**0.19**0.16+0.18**0.12**0.12*(0.055)(0.061)(0.064)(0.065)(0.083)(0.066)(0.045)(0.056)Age <sup>2</sup> -0.0036***-0.0016*-0.0017*-0.0018**-0.0014-0.0016*-0.0015**-0.0014*(0.0006)(0.0007)(0.0007)(0.0007)(0.0009)(0.0007)(0.0005)(0.0006)N (weighted)1,9411,9141,7271,7231,0661,7221,7231,066(no weights)2,0502,0231,8241,8201,1281,8181,8191,127Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> 0.0980.1890.1880.1980.2050.2170.2750.323Notes: Results from binary (col. 1-6) and ordered (col. 7 and 8) logit models (weights employed): standard error  | Middlo                | (0.24)   | (0.28)   | (0.30)          | (0.30)       | (0.40)      | (0.30)       | 0.55**   | 0.29)       |
| Income $(0.23)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.28)$ $(0.28)$ $(0.36)$ $(0.28)$ $(0.28)$ $(0.20)$ $(0.20)$ $(0.20)$ Lower- $0.091$ $0.069$ $0.088$ $0.076$ $0.49$ $0.16$ $-0.24$ $-0.38$ middle inc. $(0.23)$ $(0.25)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.34)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.21)$ $(0.26)$ Male $-0.012$ $-0.22$ $-0.29^+$ $-0.24$ $-0.53^*$ $-0.24$ $-0.085$ $-0.055$ $(0.14)$ $(0.15)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.22)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.11)$ $(0.14)$ Age $0.36^{***}$ $0.17^{**}$ $0.18^{**}$ $0.16^+$ $0.18^{**}$ $0.12^{**}$ $0.12^*$ $(0.055)$ $(0.061)$ $(0.064)$ $(0.065)$ $(0.083)$ $(0.066)$ $(0.045)$ $(0.056)$ Age <sup>2</sup> $-0.0036^{***}$ $-0.0016^*$ $-0.0017^*$ $-0.0018^{**}$ $-0.0016^*$ $-0.0015^{**}$ $-0.0014^*$ $(0.0066)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ N (weighted) $1.941$ $1.914$ $1.727$ $1.723$ $1.066$ $1.722$ $1.723$ $1.066$ (no weights) $2.050$ $2.023$ $1.824$ $1.820$ $1.128$ $1.818$ $1.819$ $1.127$ Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> $0.098$ $0.189$ $0.188$ $0.198$ $0.205$ $0.217$ $0.275$ $0.323$ Notes: Results from binary (col. 1-6) and ordered (col. 7 and 8) logit models (wei  | incomo                | 0.10     | (0.077)  | (0.28)          | (0.18)       | (0.26)      | (0.30        | -0.33    | -0.76       |
| Lower-       0.091       0.069       0.088       0.076       0.49       0.16       -0.24       -0.24       -0.38         middle inc.       (0.23)       (0.25)       (0.27)       (0.27)       (0.34)       (0.27)       (0.21)       (0.26)         Male       -0.012       -0.22       -0.29 <sup>+</sup> -0.24       -0.53 <sup>*</sup> -0.24       -0.085       -0.055         (0.14)       (0.15)       (0.16)       (0.16)       (0.22)       (0.16)       (0.11)       (0.14)         Age       0.36 <sup>***</sup> 0.17 <sup>**</sup> 0.18 <sup>**</sup> 0.19 <sup>**</sup> 0.16 <sup>+</sup> 0.18 <sup>**</sup> 0.12 <sup>**</sup> 0.12 <sup>*</sup> (0.055)       (0.061)       (0.064)       (0.065)       (0.083)       (0.066)       (0.045)       (0.056)         Age <sup>2</sup> -0.0036 <sup>***</sup> -0.0016 <sup>*</sup> -0.0017 <sup>*</sup> -0.0018 <sup>**</sup> -0.0014 <sup>*</sup> -0.0015 <sup>**</sup> -0.0014 <sup>*</sup> (0.006)       (0.0007)       (0.0007)       (0.0009)       (0.007)       (0.0005)       (0.0005)         N (weighted)       1,941       1,727       1,723       1,066       1,722       1,723       1,066         (no weights)       2,050       2,023       1,824       1,820       1,12  | Income                | (0.23)   | (0.27)   | (0.26)          | (0.26)       | (0.30)      | (0.26)       | (0.20)   | (0.20)      |
| Initiatie Inc. $(0.23)$ $(0.23)$ $(0.23)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.34)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.27)$ $(0.21)$ $(0.20)$ Male $-0.012$ $-0.22$ $-0.29^+$ $-0.24$ $-0.53^*$ $-0.24$ $-0.085$ $-0.055$ $(0.14)$ $(0.15)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.22)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.11)$ $(0.14)$ Age $0.36^{***}$ $0.17^{**}$ $0.18^{**}$ $0.19^{**}$ $0.16^+$ $0.18^{**}$ $0.12^{**}$ $0.12^*$ $(0.055)$ $(0.061)$ $(0.064)$ $(0.065)$ $(0.083)$ $(0.066)$ $(0.045)$ $(0.056)$ Age <sup>2</sup> $-0.0036^{***}$ $-0.0016^*$ $-0.0017^*$ $-0.0018^{**}$ $-0.0016^*$ $-0.0015^*$ $-0.0014^*$ $(0.0006)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.009)$ $(0.007)$ $(0.005)$ $(0.006)$ N (weighted) $1,941$ $1,914$ $1,727$ $1,723$ $1,066$ $1,722$ $1,723$ $1,066$ In weights) $2,050$ $2,023$ $1,824$ $1,820$ $1,128$ $1,818$ $1,819$ $1,127$ Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> $0.098$ $0.189$ $0.188$ $0.198$ $0.205$ $0.217$ $0.275$ $0.323$ Notes: Results from binary (col. 1-6) and ordered (col. 7 and 8) logit models (weights employed): standard error   | Lower-                | 0.091    | 0.009    | 0.066           | 0.070        | 0.49        | (0.10)       | -0.24    | -0.36       |
| Male-0.012-0.22-0.29*-0.24-0.53-0.24-0.085-0.085-0.055 $(0.14)$ $(0.15)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.22)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.11)$ $(0.14)$ Age $0.36^{***}$ $0.17^{**}$ $0.18^{**}$ $0.19^{**}$ $0.16^+$ $0.18^{**}$ $0.12^{**}$ $0.12^*$ $(0.055)$ $(0.061)$ $(0.064)$ $(0.065)$ $(0.083)$ $(0.066)$ $(0.045)$ $(0.056)$ Age <sup>2</sup> $-0.0036^{***}$ $-0.0016^*$ $-0.0017^*$ $-0.0018^{**}$ $-0.0016^*$ $-0.0015^*$ $-0.0014^*$ $(0.0006)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ N (weighted) $1.941$ $1.914$ $1.727$ $1.723$ $1.066$ $1.722$ $1.723$ $1.066$ (no weights) $2.050$ $2.023$ $1.824$ $1.820$ $1.128$ $1.818$ $1.819$ $1.127$ Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> $0.098$ $0.189$ $0.188$ $0.198$ $0.205$ $0.217$ $0.275$ $0.323$ Notes: Results from binary (col. 1-6) and ordered (col. 7 and 8) logit models (weights employed): standard error   | Mala                  | (0.23)   | (0.25)   | (0.27)          | (0.27)       | (0.34)      | (0.27)       | (0.21)   | (0.20)      |
| Age $(0.14)$ $(0.15)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.22)$ $(0.16)$ $(0.11)$ $(0.14)$ Age $0.36^{***}$ $0.17^{**}$ $0.18^{**}$ $0.19^{**}$ $0.16^+$ $0.18^{**}$ $0.12^{**}$ $0.12^*$ $(0.055)$ $(0.061)$ $(0.064)$ $(0.065)$ $(0.083)$ $(0.066)$ $(0.045)$ $(0.056)$ Age <sup>2</sup> $-0.0036^{***}$ $-0.0016^*$ $-0.0017^*$ $-0.0018^{**}$ $-0.0016^*$ $-0.0015^{**}$ $-0.0014^*$ $(0.0006)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0009)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0005)$ $(0.006)$ N (weighted) $1.941$ $1.914$ $1.727$ $1.723$ $1.066$ $1.722$ $1.723$ $1.066$ (no weights) $2.050$ $2.023$ $1.824$ $1.820$ $1.128$ $1.818$ $1.819$ $1.127$ Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> $0.098$ $0.189$ $0.188$ $0.198$ $0.205$ $0.217$ $0.275$ $0.323$ Notes: Results from binary (col. 1-6) and ordered (col. 7 and 8) logit models (weights employed): standard error  | Male                  | -0.012   | -0.22    | $-0.29^{\circ}$ | -0.24        | -0.53       | -0.24        | -0.085   | -0.055      |
| Age0.360.170.180.190.160.180.120.12 $(0.055)$ $(0.061)$ $(0.064)$ $(0.065)$ $(0.083)$ $(0.066)$ $(0.045)$ $(0.056)$ Age <sup>2</sup> $-0.0036^{***}$ $-0.0016^{*}$ $-0.0017^{*}$ $-0.0018^{**}$ $-0.0016^{*}$ $-0.0016^{*}$ $-0.0015^{**}$ $-0.0014^{*}$ $(0.0006)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0009)$ $(0.0007)$ $(0.0005)$ $(0.006)$ N (weighted)1,9411,9141,7271,7231,0661,7221,7231,066(no weights)2,0502,0231,8241,8201,1281,8181,8191,127Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> 0.0980.1890.1880.1980.2050.2170.2750.323Notes: Results from binary (col. 1-6) and ordered (col. 7 and 8) logit models (weights employed): standard error   |                       | (0.14)   | (0.15)   | (0.16)          | (0.16)       | (0.22)      | (0.16)       | (0.11)   | (0.14)      |
| Age <sup>2</sup> -0.0036***       -0.0016*       -0.0017*       -0.0018**       -0.0014       -0.0016*       -0.0016*       -0.0014*         M(weighted)       1,941       1,914       1,727       1,723       1,066       1,722       1,723       1,066         N (weighted)       2,050       2,023       1,824       1,820       1,128       1,818       1,819       1,127         Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> 0.098       0.189       0.188       0.198       0.205       0.217       0.275       0.323  | Age                   | 0.36     | 0.1/     | 0.18            | 0.19         | 0.10        | 0.18         | 0.12     | 0.12        |
| Age-       -0.0036       -0.0016       -0.0017       -0.0018       -0.0014       -0.0016       -0.0015       -0.0014         (0.0006)       (0.0007)       (0.0007)       (0.0007)       (0.0009)       (0.0007)       (0.0005)       (0.0006)         N (weighted)       1,941       1,914       1,727       1,723       1,066       1,722       1,723       1,066         (no weights)       2,050       2,023       1,824       1,820       1,128       1,818       1,819       1,127         Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> 0.098       0.189       0.198       0.205       0.217       0.275       0.323         Notes: Results from binary (col. 1-6) and ordered (col. 7 and 8) logit models (weights employed): standard error  | A === 2               | (0.055)  | (0.061)  | (0.064)         | (0.065)      | (0.083)     | (0.066)      | (0.045)  | (0.056)     |
| N (weighted)         1,941         1,914         1,727         1,723         1,066         1,722         1,723         1,066           (no weights)         2,050         2,023         1,824         1,820         1,128         1,818         1,819         1,127           Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> 0.098         0.189         0.198         0.205         0.217         0.275         0.323           Notes: Results from binary (col. 1-6) and ordered (col. 7 and 8) logit models (weights employed): standard error   | Age                   | -0.0036  | -0.0016  | -0.0017         | -0.0018      | -0.0014     | -0.0016      | -0.0015  | -0.0014     |
| N (weighted)         1,941         1,727         1,723         1,066         1,722         1,723         1,066           (no weights)         2,050         2,023         1,824         1,820         1,128         1,818         1,819         1,127           Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> 0.098         0.189         0.198         0.205         0.217         0.275         0.323           Notes: Results from binary (col. 1-6) and ordered (col. 7 and 8) logit models (weights employed): standard error   |                       | (0.0006) | (0.0007) | (0.0007)        | (0.0007)     | (0.0009)    | (0.0007)     | (0.0005) | (0.0006)    |
| (no weights)         2,050         2,023         1,824         1,820         1,128         1,818         1,819         1,127           Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> 0.098         0.189         0.198         0.205         0.217         0.275         0.323           Notes: Results from binary (col. 1-6) and ordered (col. 7 and 8) logit models (weights employed): standard error  | N (weighted)          | 1,941    | 1,914    | 1,727           | 1,723        | 1,066       | 1,722        | 1,723    | 1,066       |
| Pseudo-K <sup>2</sup> 0.098         0.189         0.188         0.198         0.205         0.217         0.275         0.323           Notes: Results from binary (col. 1-6) and ordered (col. 7 and 8) logit models (weights employed): standard error   | (no weights)          | 2,050    | 2,023    | 1,824           | 1,820        | 1,128       | 1,818        | 1,819    | 1,127       |
| Notes: Results from binary (col. 1-6) and ordered (col. 7 and 8) logit models (weights employed): standard error   | Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> | 0.098    | 0.189    | 0.188           | 0.198        | 0.205       | 0.217        | 0.275    | 0.323       |
| in parenthered appoint and dut offer not all sums Decide $\mathbf{D}^2$ is $\mathbf{M}_0$ (allows $(\mathbf{Z}^{-1}, \mathbf{D}^2) + \mathbf{z} < 0.10^{-4}$   |                       |          |          |                 |              |             |              |          |             |

Table A.1: Binary and ordered logistic regressions - listwise deletion

Ρ , p Ρ - , < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001.

### 4. Model Underlying Figure 4

The model underlying the average marginal effect plot in Figure 4 of the article models the interaction in the following form:

$$\beta_1(RTM) + \beta_2(position) + \beta_3(RTM * position) + \beta_4(position^2) + \beta_5(RTM * position^2)$$

This specification thus takes advantage of the numerical value of the position on the leftright scale rather than just collapsing the information into two categories. It furthers allows the left-right position to have a non-linear effect and interacts the in this way specified ideological position with the rtm variable. The detailed estimation results underlying the average marginal effect plot in Figure 4 are shown in Table A.2 below. Note, that none of the terms involved in the interaction is itself statistically significant. The terms are strongly collinear by construction. A test for the joint significance of the five terms involved in the interaction results in a p-value of 0.003.

| Table A.2: Ordered logistic regression models for perceived meaningfulness of e | lection: |
|---|----------|
| Non-linear interaction effect   |          |

| Perceived room to manoeuvre (rtm)  | 1.70                                  | (1.39)    |  |  |  |
|--|---------------------------------------|-----------|--|--|--|
| Left-right position  | -0.099                                | (0.32)    |  |  |  |
| Rtm X left-right position  | 0.035                                 | (0.55)    |  |  |  |
| Left-right position <sup>2</sup>   | 0.026                                 | (0.030)   |  |  |  |
| Rtm X left-right position <sup>2</sup>   | -0.031                                | (0.054)   |  |  |  |
| Duty to vote   | 0.056                                 | (0.18)    |  |  |  |
| Pol. interest  | 2.78***                               | (0.33)    |  |  |  |
| Pol. knowledge   | -0.056                                | (0.29)    |  |  |  |
| PI Conservatives   | 0.66*                                 | (0.29)    |  |  |  |
| PI Labour  | 0.92**                                | (0.29)    |  |  |  |
| PI Liberal Democrats   | 0.37                                  | (0.29)    |  |  |  |
| PI SNP   | 0.78                                  | (0.53)    |  |  |  |
| PI other   | 0.25                                  | (0.47)    |  |  |  |
| Ext. efficacy  | 0.98**                                | (0.34)    |  |  |  |
| Int. efficacy  | -0.12                                 | (0.31)    |  |  |  |
| Party differences  | 2.07***                               | (0.19)    |  |  |  |
| Higher education degree  | -0.046                                | (0.23)    |  |  |  |
| Higher education   | 0.11                                  | (0.22)    |  |  |  |
| A-level  | 0.13                                  | (0.25)    |  |  |  |
| O-level  | 0.22                                  | (0.20)    |  |  |  |
| Upper income   | -0.23                                 | (0.28)    |  |  |  |
| Upper-middle income  | -0.23                                 | (0.27)    |  |  |  |
| Middle income  | -0.54*                                | (0.24)    |  |  |  |
| Lower-middle income  | -0.11                                 | (0.25)    |  |  |  |
| Male   | -0.10                                 | (0.13)    |  |  |  |
| Age (centered, decades)  | 0.14**                                | (0.052)   |  |  |  |
| Age (centered, decades) <sup>2</sup>   | -0.0015*                              | (0.00063) |  |  |  |
| Cut point 1  | -1.05                                 | (0.95)    |  |  |  |
| Cut point 2  | $1.84^{+}$                            | (0.95)    |  |  |  |
| Cut point 3  | 3.46***                               | (0.96)    |  |  |  |
| Cut point 4  | 5.51***                               | (0.97)    |  |  |  |
| -  |                                       |           |  |  |  |
| N, weighted  | 1330                                  |           |  |  |  |
| N, unweighted  | 1402                                  |           |  |  |  |
| Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> (McKelvey/Zavoina)   | 0.311                                 |           |  |  |  |
| Notes: Results from ordered logistic regressions with weighted data; standard errors in parentheses; |                                       |           |  |  |  |
|  | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |           |  |  |  |

reference categories are no degree (education), lower income (income), female, no party identification; p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.01, p < 0.001.